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Abstract
This thesis seeks to consider the potential that an analysis of the feminist-
postmodemist debate in light of the linguistic tum may hold. To date, very few feminist
theorists have directly engaged with the linguistic tum, even though this most recent
revolution in philosophical thought has drastic implications for theory itself, and more
importantly, for theory that seeks to influence or describe political engagement. In
Chapter One, I begin by outlining the significance of the linguistic tum in the
development of the postmodem agenda. I then explore the difficult terrain of the tense
relationship between feminism and postmodemism in Chapter Two. Finally, in Chapter
Three, I critically analyse the way in which viewing the feminist-postmodernist debate in
light of the imperatives of the linguistic turn can help to ease the tensions that have
clouded this relationship from its very outset. By examining three major aspects of
postmodemism upon which feminist theorists concentrate - the subject, history, and
metaphysics - I attempt to locate where each theorist is positioned in relation to both the
linguistic tum and postmodemism. I conclude that, even though contemporary feminist
theory works within the horizon of the linguistic tum, many feminist theorists have not
embraced the imperatives that come along with it. Indeed, many feminist theorists who
advocate an alliance with postmodemism, still retain vestiges of representational
knowledge within their philosophical systems, which is incompatible with taking the
linguistic tum. I end by considering the epistemological options that are available after
the demise of the episteme of representation, arguing that any feminist theory that seeks
to influence or describe feminist political action, must maintain an epistemological basis.
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INTRODUCTION
In Situating the Self, Benhabib writes,
Why is this question concerning the identity and future and maybe
the possibility of philosophy of interest to feminists? Can feminist
theory not flourish without getting embroiled in the arcane debate
about the end or transformation ofphilosophy? The inclination of
the majority of feminist theorists at the present is to argue that we
can side-step this question; even ifwe do not want to ignore it, we
must not be committed to answer it one way or another. I
However, while it may be possible to avoid this 'arcane debate,' it seems to be the case
that many feminist theorists have indeed jumped in with both feet, typically landing
decisively on one side or the other. This thesis explores the discussion among feminist
theorists regarding the end or transformation of philosophy. This discussion is infused
with new flavour by feminist theorists, who ask: what implications does the postmodern
tum hold for feminist political practice? In other words, what is the practical fallout of
such a dramatic theoretical shift? There can be no question that traditional (liberal and
radical) feminist theory is couched within a modem framework. However, the theoretical
demands of postmodernism, and the practical demands of cultural feminism have led to a
significant amount of controversy among the ranks of feminists.
In order to lend focus to my argument, I have chosen to concentrate on six
authors, whose work comprises "Feminism As Against Epistemology?", Part I of the
anthology Feminism/Postmodernism.2 In this collection of essays, Nancy Fraser and
Linda Nicholson, Jane Flax, Christine Di Stefano, Sandra Harding, and Seyla Benhabib
I Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self: Gender Community and
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992) 224.
2 Feminism/Postmodernism ed. Linda 1. Nicholson. (New York: Routledge, 1990)
enter into discussions about the relationship between feminism and postmodernism,
specifically attending to the implications that the demise of the modern philosophical
project may hold for feminist theory and politics. All of these theorists note (or at least
imply) that the relationship is chiefly characterized by ambivalence, yet make an attempt
to define the proper location offeminist theory, whether it be 'after philosophy,' or 'after
the transformation ofphilosophy. ,
It should also be noted that, because of the practical limitations of this work, I
have chosen to explore the feminist reaction to two particular postrnodernists - Jean-
Francois Lyotard and Richard Rorty - and the particular line of argumentation that they
support, that is, their dissatisfaction with modern philosophy, understood as a
metanarrative or as a discourse of legitimation. This dissatisfaction includes three
dimensions of which I take specific note, namely, the critiques of the self, of history, and
of metaphysics. Not only do these three dimensions figure significantly in the
postmodern critique of modern philosophy, but they are also the central points that create
tension among feminist theorists who engage in discussions regarding postmodernism.
This limitation also means that the positions of postmodern thinkers such as
Foucault and Derrida are not included within this project. Although the influence of their
arguments will certainly colour many aspects of my exegesis and argument, they are not
explicitly addressed. Another way to understand the specificity imposed upon this thesis
is to place my argument in the context of Nancy Fraser's article, Pragmatism, Feminism,
and the Linguistic Turn, where she recasts disagreements between various feminist
theorists (namely, Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler and Drucilla Cornell) as "disputes over
the most fruitful way for feminists of making the linguistic tum.") She presents us with
three
'party-line' alternatives: 1) a Habermassian perspective oriented to the
validity claims implicit in intersubjective communication, which are held
to ground a discourse ethics and a procedural conception of democratic
publicity (Benhabib); 2) a Foucauldian perspective oriented to a plurality
of contingent, historically specific, power-laden discursive regimes that
construct various subject positions from which innovation is possible
(Butler); and 3) a Lacanian/Derridean perspective oriented to a masculine,
phallogocentric symbolic order that suppresses the feminine while
dissimulating its own groundlessness.4
In this paper, I am interested primarily in the first of these alternatives, and the debate
that deals explicitly with Benhabib's concern regarding political action within a
democracy.
Thus, I seek to open up a dialogue in order to determine the potential that an
analysis of the feminist-postmodernist debate in light of the linguistic tum may hold.
What I hope to reveal is that those feminist theorists who advocate an alliance with
postmodernism often do not go far enough. In some cases, they have made the linguistic
tum, but wrongfully equate this move with taking up a postmodern position. In other
cases, those feminist theorists who advocate an alliance with postmodernism construct
theories that rely on an appropriation of representational knowledge.
3 Nancy Fraser, "Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn," Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical
Exchange. ( ew York: Routledge, 1995) 158.
4 Fraser, "Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Tum," 158.
CHAPTER ONE
THE LINGUISTIC TURN AND POSTMODERNISM
We should not try to have a successor subject to
epistemology, but rather try to free ourselves from
the notion that philosophy must center around
the discovery ofa permanent framework for inquiry.
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (380)
Chapter One seeks to accomplish two things: 1. To identify and define the
linguistic tum, and 2. To demonstrate how the linguistic tum laid the groundwork for
postmodemism. The broader context in which these goals are located is to show that any
debate regarding postmodemism would be well-served by an understanding of the central
role played by the linguistic tum in the development of the postrnodem agenda. In order
to demonstrate the importance of the linguistic tum, I will begin by outlining, in very
broad strokes, the epistemological enterprise that was the focus of the modem
philosophical project. Second, I will outline three lines of critique of the modem
epistemological projectS, paying specific attention to the third of these - the critique of
the modem concept of the sign - which culminates in the linguistic tum. Finally, by
examining the positions of two of the leading proponents of postrnodemism - Jean-
Francois Lyotard and Richard Rorty - I will demonstrate the way in which the new
philosophical method introduced by the linguistic tum laid the groundwork for the
postmodem agenda.
5 I have taken these from Seyla Benhabib's essay "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," which
is found in her collection of essays entitled Situating the Self: Gender Community and Postmodemism in
Contemporary Ethics. (New York: Routledge, 1992)
1.1 The Modern Episteme of Representation
The implementation of the Cartesian method of doubt proved to be a
transformative power in the history of philosophy. This method sprang from Rene
Descartes' desire to overcome the errors of his philosophical predecessors, and was
designed to answer one specific question: 'What can I know with certainty?' Descartes'
conclusion was Cogito ergo sum - I think, therefore I am. With this declaration,
Descartes demonstrated that it could be known, with certainty that the self as pure,
thinking substance, exists, even though the existence of the external world could
plausibly be doubted. This Cartesian self is a non-material substance that underlies all
mental states and activities. It is "a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies,
wills, refuses and which also imagines and feels.,,6 This non-material substance, res
cogitans, is set over and against the material universe, res extensa.
The problem which then beset the Cartesian system was the co-existence of
thought and extension. Indeed, how could these two disparate substances be connected?
The dualism of mind and body became a central concern of philosophy after Descartes,
and modern philosophical inquiry turned to the question of the causal relation between
these two vastly different and independent substances. The emergence of this question
reveals that the Cartesian subjective turn also instigated the epistemological turn.
Richard Rorty succinctly phrases the issue as follows: "The idea of a discipline devoted
to 'the nature, origin, and limits of knowledge' - the textbook definition of
6 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems fourth edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1971)243.
'epistemology' - required a field of study called "the human mind," and that field of
study was what Descartes had created."?
Descartes' dualism, spurred into existence by the Cartesian method of doubt,
created a philosophical milieu that dealt with the possibility of knowledge about the
external world. In order to answer this question, it was necessary to clarify the
connection between subject and object. Debate on this front gave rise to two distinct
camps, the rationalists and the empiricists. The former argued that a priori reason was
the unique path to knowledge, and that knowledge was obtained through intuition and
deduction. The latter argued that the concepts or beliefs that constituted knowledge were
derived from a posteriori experience, and thus that experience played the primary role in
human knowledge. In either case, philosophy's goal to determine what constituted
knowledge was henceforth the defining feature of modem thought.
Questions of knowledge and how it was obtained formed the horizon of modem
philosophical inquiry. But what system was devised to allow the subject to gain
knowledge about the external, material world? The solution that was provided by
modem philosophers, and that so fully captured the modern philosophical mind, was the
episteme of representation. According to representationalism, the subject does not have
direct access to the external world. Thus, in order to gain knowledge of this inaccessible
external reality, objects must be represented internally, in the subject's consciousness. In
other words, if X is an object in the world, and X is accurately represented in the
7 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979)
140.
subject's consciousness, then the subject knows X. Because the subject can know, with
certainty, that which is represented internally, this is the only route to knowledge. In
short, the episteme of representation provides an understanding of "knowledge as
representation, according to which the subject stands over against an independent world
of objects that it can more or less accurately represent."g
Within this new context, "Philosophy has the privileged role of determining the
criteria for judging that our representations are adequate to reality.,,9 Thus, philosophy
became the basis upon which the presuppositions of other sciences were examined, and
sought to articulate the essential rules that the empirical sciences were to follow in order
to claim that they had discovered truths. As Rorty states, "The eventual demarcation of
philosophy from science was made possible by the notion that philosophy's core was
"theory of knowledge," a theory distinct from the sciences because it was their
foundation."ID That is, philosophy's role as the adjudicator of knowledge claims
cemented its foundational status. Rorty summarizes the modem epistemological project
as follows:
To know is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand
the possibility and nature of knowledge is to understand the way in which the
mind is able to construct such representations. Philosophy's central concern
is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture
up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well,
and those which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing SO.)11
8 Kenneth Baynes, "General Introduction," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? eds. Kenneth
Baynes et. al.. (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987) 4-5.
9 Gary Gutting, "Rorty, Richard," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition, ed. Robert
Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 798.
10 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 132.
11 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 3.
Knowledge, so argue the modem philosophers, is achieved when the dualism of
mind and nature is made congruous. In order to manage this dualism, representations in
consciousness have to be accurately aligned with the world of objects outside of the self.
When any particular set of representations are aligned, a truth is obtained. This process
became the defining feature of modem philosophical inquiry. Whether empiricist or
rationalist, the desire to overcome the schism between the world of thought and the world
of objects was the aim and purpose of the modem episteme. Within this philosophical
landscape, "knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent reality.
In its original form it saw knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality.,,12
However, this epistemology was intrinsically unstable and thus exhibited a proclivity
toward self-criticism. Rationalism became increasingly dogmatic, as its metaphysical
speculations seemed to be beyond dispute. On the other hand, empiricism became
increasingly skeptical, as what we experience, and thus know, was subjected to intense
scrutiny. Thus, the divide between rationalism and empiricism grew ever more hostile,
and yet neither, it seemed, could provide an adequate account of the way in which
knowledge was obtained.
1.2 The Critique of the Modern Epistemological Project
The self-critical tendency of modem philosophy is most clearly demonstrated in
the work of Immanuel Kant, whose admiration for the progress of science left him with
12 Charles Taylor, "Overcoming Epistemology," Philosophy: End or Transformation? eds. Kenneth
Baynes et. a1.. (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987) 466.
serious concerns about the adequacy of either rationalism or empiricism in explaining
how knowledge was obtained. Thus, Kant sought to develop an epistemological system
that could explain the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, as well as provide
justification for the continuation of science. According to a commentator, Kant
hypothesized that "every human being, having the faculty of thought, inevitably thinks
about things in accordance with the natural structure of the mind.,,13 In other words, Kant
embraces subjectivity as the grounds of knowledge, insisting that the mind, through the
categories of the understanding, imposes rules of organization and synthesis upon the
world. Thus, the mind becomes an active agent in the production of knowledge, and
universal subjectivity becomes a necessary condition for the possibility of a world of
objects.
Kantian epistemology places strict limits on what can be known. Kant concludes
that metaphysical knowledge is not possible because we can only gain knowledge of that
which can be experienced. Thus, we can only know the phenomenal (the world as it is
experienced), while the noumenal (intelligible reality) cannot be known. In other words,
"there is a reality external to us that exists independently of us but that we can know only
as it appears to us and is organized by US.,,14 While we can think about metaphysical
concepts, such as the self, the cosmos, or God, it is not possible to gain knowledge of
these things. As a result, Kant's epistemology goes beyond the traditional subject-object
dualism of modem philosophy, but retains vestiges of dualistic thought insofar as he
13 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems fourth edition. (New York: McGraw-Hili
Inc., 1971) 307.
14 Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems 309.
imposes a new, higher-order dualism, between the phenomenal and the noumenal.
Within Kant's philosophy, the subject becomes a transcendental, self-conscious
unity, which functions as a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge. He
argues that "the unity of our experience must imply a unity of the self, for unless there
was a unity between the several operations of the mind, there could be no knowledge of
experience.,,15 However, because we do not directly experience the self as a unity, we
must rely on that which is implied by our experience. That is, through pure reason, we
formulate a concept of the self as a unified whole. Thus, the Cartesian subject is divided
in two - the phenomenal self, which is ruled by natural necessity and can be known, and
the transcendental self, which is free and creative, but cannot be known.
Kantian epistemology possessed a residual dualism that raised questions about the
way in which the phenomenal and transcendental could co-exist. This was taken up as a
major focus of post-Kantian critical discussion, allowing the critique of epistemology to
continue unabated. The role of the transcendental self, and the distinction between this
self and the phenomenal self, resulted in the construction of a rigorous critique of the
subject. Kant's emphasis on the impact of consciousness in shaping reality led to a more
robust critique of the object. Finally, Kant's elaborate epistemological system, which
retained a dualism that set the transcendental self apart from phenomenal reality, allowed
room for the development of a critique of the sign. These three lines of critique - of the
modem concept of the subject, of the modem concept of the object, and of the modem
15 Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems 308.
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concept of the sign, are explicated by Seyla Benhabib, and fonn the content of the
remainder of section 1.2.
1.2.1 The Critique of the Modern Concept of the Subject
The subject, according to modem thought, is "atomistic and autonomous,
disengaged and disembodied, and, at least on some views, potentially and ideally self-
transparent.,,16 That is, the pre-Kantian subject is an autonomous, rational being, who is
set apart from and can know the world. Kant's critical philosophy instigates a line of
inquiry that questions both of these central features of the modem subject. First, Kant
limits the rational powers of the subject such that knowledge cannot be gained through
reason, but only through experience. Secondly, Kant brings the self and world together,
insisting that they are mutually implicatory, rather than directly opposed.
While Kant's critical philosophy placed strict limits on reason, the Post-Kantian
critique of the modem concept of the subject calls into question whether any sort of pure,
rational deliberation is possible. Postmodem critics argue that the self is constituted not
only by conscious, rational thought, but by unconscious, irrational impulses as well.
Thus, the Cartesian self is no longer able to accumulate clear and distinct ideas, nor is the
Kantian self capable of pure, rational speculation of the sort that leads to an
understanding of the self as a unified whole. Rather, the subject is "controlled by desires,
needs and forces whose effects upon it shape both the contents of its clear and distinct
ideas, as well as its capacity to organize them.,,17
16 Baynes, "General Introduction," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 4.
17 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostrnodemism," Situating the Self 207.
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Postmodem critics also challenge the idea that the modem self is disengaged and
disembodied. Consciousness, the critics argue, is social in nature rather than
autonomously rational. Both thought and action are coloured by cultural and historical
influences, and a priori judgements are not possible. Moreover, to oppose mind and body
is an inadequate presupposition. The two are inextricably linked, and this relationship
necessarily alters the structure of knowledge as conceived by modem thinkers. Thus, the
modem subject is replaced with "the view of an active, producing, fabricating humanity,
creating the conditions of objectivity by forming nature through its own activity.,,18 The
self becomes a "social, historical or linguistic artifact, not a noumenal or transcendental
Being." 19 In other words, the Cartesian self, transformed into the transcendental self by
Kant's critical philosophy, is now reduced to the phenomenal self only. That is, the
creative power of Kant's transcendental self is gathered within a historically situated,
empirical being.
1.2.2 The Critique of the Modern Concept of the Object
Pre-Kantian modem philosophy understands the object as that which is the
unchanging 'real' that exists independently of, and can be known by, the modem subject.
Contrary to this view, Kant argues that reality is formed through the active agency of the
mind, and that the self cannot access reality except through the categories of the
understanding which are brought to the given. Thus, while we are able to know the
phenomenal world, we do not have access to the noumenal, or 'things-in-themselves.'
18 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 207.
19 Flax, Thinking Fragments 32.
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Rather, noumenal reality - the world as a totality - is posited by pure reason or
metaphysical speculation.
Postmodern critics follow Kant in claiming that the object is not independent of
the observer. However, critics wish to avoid the higher-order, transcendental dualism
that Kant employs to resolve the problem of skepticism at the phenomenal level. In order
to do so, this critique begins by asserting that the external world is a web of relations that
includes all objects in the world, as well as the supposedly sovereign self. The Kantian
epistemological framework, they argue, overlooks "the background conditions that
enable entities to show up as counting or mattering in some specific way in the first
place.,,2o While Kant opened the door for this criticism by insisting that we impose our
way of knowing upon the world, postmodern critics go one step further in arguing that we
also infuse the world with specific significance in accordance with our goals and projects.
Moreover, postmodern critics insist that Kant, insofar as his transcendental
critique of reason seeks to justify the conclusions and continuation of Newtonian science,
contributes to the tradition of creating a philosophical system through which the world is
designed to be controlled. According to this view, the ideal of modem rationality is
based on the domination of nature and other human beings. Western reason, these critics
20 Charles B. Guignon, "Heidegger, Martin," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition,
ed. Robert Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 370. To fully investigate Heidegger's
phenomenological criticism of Kant is surely outside the scope of this thesis. For my purposes here, it
should suffice to note that Heidegger argues that traditional theories of human existence tend to focus on
"our ways of existing when we are engaged in theorizing and detached reflection," rather than our "average
everydayness." (Guignon, 371) Because of this tendency, we end up with a subject-object distinction,
which doesn't account for the totality of human experience, including the way we interact with objects in
the world. Because Kant's transcendental dualism is constructed without taking into account this "average
everydayness," it is therefore inadequate.
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argue, "imposes homogeneity and identity upon the heterogeneity of material,..21
allowing it to become more easily navigable, and hence more easily dominated.
Ultimately, the critique of the modem concept of the object suggests that there is no
independent world of objects, and that the modem creation of an external reality, set apart
from the knowing subject, is an abstraction designed to create a dominatory relation
between the two sides of the dichotomy.
1.2.3 The Critique ofthe Modern Concept of the Sign
Finally, it is the third critique - the critique of the modem concept of the sign -
that, of the three, provides the most profound critique of the episteme of representation.
The modem concept of the sign holds a specific position within the modem episteme of
representation. A collection of signs, or a language, is used to either represent external
objects, or express the inner states of the subject. Language, therefore, is a medium
between internal and external, thought and extension, subject and object. Richard Rorty
employs the metaphor of 'mirroring nature' to describe the state of modem epistemology.
He explains it in the following way:
The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind
as a great mirror, containing various representations - some accurate, some
not - and capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methods. Without
the notion of the mind as mirror, the notion ofknowledge as accuracy of
representation would not have suggested itself. Without this latter notion, the
strategy common to Descartes and Kant - getting more accurate representations
~a~~s~:~~~~fi repairing, and polishing the mirror, so to speak - would not have
2\ Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 208.
22 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 12.
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The critique of the modern concept of the sign emphasizes the public character of
language in opposition to the private character as endorsed by the representational view
of knowledge. Within the episteme of representation, language is private in the sense that
signs are representations that are located in an individual's consciousness. With the
critique of the sign, there is a "move in the analysis of language from the private to the
public, from consciousness to sign, [and] from the individual word to a system of
relations among linguistic signs.,,23 So, rather than a collection of private signs, language
is seen as a public affair.
Furthermore, this critique suggests that "the object of knowledge is always
already preinterpreted, situated in a scheme, part of a text, outside which there are only
other texts. On the other hand, the subject of knowledge belongs to the very world it
wishes to interpret.,,24 It is through this claim that the critique of the sign draws into itself
the critiques of the subject and object. Given the importance of the subject-object
dichotomy in modern thought, the deterioration of this dualism, through the critique of
the modern concept of the sign, holds profound implications for the episteme of
representation. The rejection of representational knowledge is the strongest impetus in
the paradigmatic shift from modernism to postmodernism. Because the defining feature
of modern philosophy was its epistemological focus, the rejection of the modern theory
of knowledge was groundbreaking, to say the least.
The critique of the sign - and ultimately, the linguistic turn - is the chief
23 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodemism," Situating the Self 208.
24 Baynes," General Introduction," 5.
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motivator in the transformation from the modem episteme to postmodernism. Given the
importance of the critique of the sign and its culmination in the linguistic tum, it is clear
that this movement requires further examination.
1.3 The Linguistic Turn
The linguistic tum ushered in a new style of philosophical methodology -
linguistic philosophy. This new methodology, which has taken hold of the philosophical
mind since the middle of the century, is "the view that philosophical problems are
problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language or by
understanding more about the language we presently use.,,25 In other words,
philosophical problems will no longer be solved by further investigation into the
conditions for the possibility of knowledge. As Moritz Schlick states, "the fate of all
"philosophical problems" is this: Some of them will disappear by being shown to be
mistakes and misunderstandings of our language and the others will be found to be
ordinary scientific questions in disguise. These remarks, I think, determine the whole
future ofphilosophy.,,26
The linguistic tum is particularly notable because it was a methodological revolt,
rather than a continuation of traditional methodology. Similar to the Cartesian subjective
and epistemological turns, the linguistic tum provided a completely new focus for, and
way of doing, philosophy. Like all methodological revolutions, the linguistic tum began
25 Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy," The Linguistic
I!!m., ed. Richard Rorty. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967) 3.
26 Moritz Schlick, "The Future of Philosophy," The Linguistic Tum ed. Richard Rorty. (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1967) 51.
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as the search for a neutral standpoint. The desire to overcome the presuppositions held
by the prelinguistic philosophers pushed thinkers of the early 1900s to develop their new
method of linguistic philosophy. Indeed, this desire is the machinery that typically drives
philosophy forward, and by which new issues arise for debate. The presuppositions that
the linguistic philosophers sought to reveal and overcome included, first and foremost,
the idea of knowledge as representation. In so doing, philosophy after the linguistic tum
focused primarily on the examination of language.
After the tum, linguistic philosophy followed two major directions, Ideal
Language Philosophy (lLP) and Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP). The first (ILP)
was initiated by Russell, carried on by the Vienna Circle, and later influenced the logical
positivist movement. The central tenet of ILP dictates that philosophical problems can be
solved (or dissolved) by properly representing them within a system of notation that
requires the structure of expressions to mirror the structure of that which is represented.
An Ideal Language would be logically perfect, allowing no room for vagueness or
ambiguity. Any philosophical problem, according to Russell, can be restated in
(Fregeian) logical form, at which point it will be possible to determine that the problem is
either not philosophical, or that it is due to logical difficulties. Philosophical problems,
on this account, are not hard to solve, but rather hard to state.
Thus, logic is employed to simplify philosophical language and, consequently,
philosophical problems as well. Ultimately, any sentence that is not logically perfect, or
cannot be placed into a system that is logically coherent, is rendered meaningless. Only
formal logic has the power to uncover whether a sentence has meaning or not. According
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to Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, "the structure of language reveals the
structure of the world [and] every meaningful sentence is analyzable into atomic
constituents that designate the fine-grained constituents of reality." 27 However, while
ILP is revolutionary in that it turns to language to solve philosophical problems, the ILP
understanding of language does not move beyond the modem ideal of representational
knowledge. ILP seeks simply to clarify the way in which language 'hooks onto' the
world. It is only with OLP that language stops being understood as a medium, and
therefore signals the demise of the modem episteme.
The second branch of linguistic philosophy, (OLP), opposes itself to ILP in that
these philosophers focus not on the logical form of language, but on the ordinary,
everyday usage of language instead. More fundamentally, OLP philosophers accuse ILP
of maintaining a representational view of language. OLP philosophers argue that "long-
standing philosophical muddles [result] from a natural tendency, when pursuing
philosophical theses, to be misled by the grammatical form of sentences in which those
questions were posed.,,28 Inspired by Wittgenstein's later work, Philosophical
Investigations, in which he renounces his Tractarian view, OLP philosophers29 contend
that concepts are fixed by linguistic practice. It is only when concepts are removed from
their original language games that philosophical quandaries arise. It is when
philosophers are 'bewitched' by language and begin using words such as 'truth' or
27 John Heil, "analytic philosophy," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition, ed. Robert
Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 26.
28 Heil, "analytic philosophy," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 26.
29 Ordinary Language Philosophy is most closely associated with the names ofWittgenstein, Wisdom,
Ryle, Malcolm, and Austin.
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'knowledge' philosophically, that muddles emerge. For the Ordinary Language
philosopher, there is nothing beyond language to which words are intended to
correspond. Because of this, the meanings of words and rules for their use are no longer
fixed, but dynamic, capable of evolving or being transformed.
However, a new methodology such as aLP can be difficult to defend. "Since
philosophical method is in itself a philosophical topic, ...every philosophical
revolutionary is open to the charge of circularity or to the charge of having begged the
question.,,3o How then, can linguistic philosophy be defended against its opponents?
Quite simply, the most common response is the pragmatic one, which involves "linguistic
philosophers pointing with pride to their own linguistic reforms and/or descriptions of
language, and saying, 'Look, no problems!,.,,3!
Regardless of these difficulties, aLP's emphasis on the role of language in use
was taken up by two of the leading proponents ofpostmodernism, Jean-Francois Lyotard
and Richard Rorty. Linguistic philosophers "do not think that when we say something
we must necessarily be expressing a view about a subject. We might just be saying
something - participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry.
Perhaps saying things is not always saying how things are.,,32 On this view,
understanding language as communication rather than representation, entertaining the
possibility that philosophical problems disappear when one examines language in use, is
to effectively eliminate the episteme of representation.
30 Rorty, "Introduction," The Linguistic Turn 1-2.
31 Rorty, "Introduction," The Linguistic Turn 3.
32 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 371.
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So what becomes of philosophy if traditional epistemology is so radically
undermined? Indeed, "it is difficult to imagine that any activity would be entitled to bear
the name "philosophy" if it had nothing to do with knowledge.,,33 Lyotard and Rorty
both provide similar answers to this question, which amount to the claim that maintaining
a conversation can be considered a sufficient aim of philosophy. If wisdom can be
understood as the ability to sustain a conversation, then we have not necessarily reached
the end of philosophy, but rather redefined its purposes and processes. Ultimately, their
postmodern positions contend that "philosophers' moral concern should be with
continuing the conversation of the West, rather than with insisting upon a place for the
traditional problems of modem philosophy within that conversation.,,34
1.4 The Postmodern Agenda
To draw out the connection between the linguistic tum and postmodernism, allow
me to further explore the domain of postmodernism, including a more thorough
investigation of the postmodern agendas of both Lyotard and Rorty. In their introduction
to After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Baynes et. al. point out that all postrnodern
thinkers have made the 'linguistic tum.' However, this does not necessarily imply that
postmodernism is a coherent, clearly circumscribed set of beliefs or ideals. The attempt
to define the limits of postmodernism has caused philosophers to debate the usefulness of
philosophy - some calling for its end, others calling for a transformation of its practices.
33 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 357.
34 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature 394.
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Indeed, "The word 'postmodem' is...characterized, from its very inception, by an
ambiguity. On the one hand it is seen as a historical period; on the other it is simply a
desire, a mood which looks to the future to redeem the present.,,35
While all postmodem thinkers have made the linguistic tum and share modem
thought as a common enemy, they do not necessarily approach the issues in the same
way, and this has certainly lent an air of confusion to the movement. Yet there are a few
characteristics that can be identified as distinctly postmodem.
Postmodem philosophy is...usefully regarded as a complex cluster concept
that includes the following: an anti- (or post-) epistemological standpoint;
anti-essentialism, anti-realism, anti-foundationalism; opposition to transcen-
dental arguments and transcendental standpoints; rejection of the picture of
knowledge as accurate representation; rejection of truth as correspondence to
reality; rejection of final vocabularies, i.e., rejection of principles, distinctions,
and descriptions that are thought to be unconditionally binding for all times,
persons, and places; and a suspicion of grand narratives, metanarratives of the
sort perhaps best illustrated by dialectical materialism.36
However, these are clearly all negative descriptions, and we are no closer to
understanding the positive postmodem agenda. The question remains: with what does
the postmodemist seek to replace Enlightenment epistemology? If we no longer study
the 'foundations of knowledge,' what do we study? Where does the denial of
epistemology lead? While the answer to this question varies amongst postmodem
thinkers, Lyotard, who emphasizes the 'agonistics' of language, and Rorty, who argues
for rhetoric over reason, can be usefully considered as significant contributors to the
postmodem movement.
35 Baynes, "General Introduction," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 2.
36 Bernd Magnus, "postrnodern," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition, ed. Robert
Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 725.
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1.4.1 Jean-Francois Lyotard: The Agonistics of Language
In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard defines the tenn postmodern as an
"incredulity toward metanarratives,,,37 which "resides constantly at the heart of the
modem, challenging those totalizing and comprehensive master narratives... that serve to
legitimate its practices.,,38 Under modernity, philosophical metanarratives are self-
legitimizing in that they provide the end toward which the philosophical method is aimed.
Metanarratives define both the end and the means of obtaining it. These discourses of
legitimation, such as "the dialectics of Spirit, the henneneutics of meaning, the
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth,,,39 are thus
used to define truth and knowledge. In tum, philosophers can employ these notions in
order to become a "hero of knowledge [who] works toward a good ethico-political end -
universal peace.,,40 Lyotard contends that we must "refrain from totalizing claims in
favour of recognizing the specificity and singularity of events.,,41 In other words,
legitimation must be local and context-specific. There can be no universal set of rules,
such as those found in metanarratives, to which one can appeal. Rather, courses of
action, including speech, are pragmatically detennined, an~ dependent upon the context
in which they are defined.
37 Jean-Francois Lyotard, "The Postmodem Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? eds.
Kenneth Baynes et. al.. (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987) 74.
38 Alan D. Schrift, "Lyotard, Jean-Francois," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition,
ed. Robert Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 523.
39 Lyotard, "The Postmodem Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 73.
40 Lyotard, "The Postmodem Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 73.
4\ Schrift, "Lyotard, Jean-Francois," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 523.
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Legitimation, then, "can only spring from [one's] own linguistic practice and
communicational interaction.'.42 That is, our goals and the means by which they are
obtained are specific to any particular language game. However, Lyotard appeals to the
'agonistics of language,' claiming that we employ an "argumentative, discursive
practice...to speak is to fight, in the sense ofplaying.,,43 He defies the idea that we seek
consensus of the sort proposed by Jurgen Habermas,44 because this still assumes that
"humanity as a collective (universal) subject seeks its common emancipation through the
regularization of the 'moves' permitted in all language games and that the legitimacy of
any statement resides in its contributing to that emancipation.,,45 It is absurd, he argues,
to find any 'metaprescriptives' common to the wide array of language games. Rather,
language games are "heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic
rules.',46
When a political or aesthetic judgement is required, but there is no common rule
to which one can appeal, Lyotard invokes the differend, which allows a dispute that
defies resolution to be posed in such a way that neither party's claim is delegitimated.
Differends arise when there is a dispute between "parties [that] operate within radically
heterogeneous language games so incommensurate that no consensus can be reached on
42 Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 87.
43 Seyla Benhabib, "Epistemologies ofPostmodernism: A Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard,"
Feminism/Postmodernism. ed. Linda J. Nicholson. (New York: Routledge, 1990) lB.
44 Habermas "argues for an intersubjective notion of practical reason and discursive procedure for the
justification of universal norms," which can then be used toward the goal of emancipation. From James
Bohman, "Habermas, Jurgen," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition, ed. Robert Audi.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 359.
45 Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 88.
46 Lyotard, "The Postmodern Condition," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 88.
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principles or rules that could govern how their dispute might be settled.'>47 Thus,
Lyotard's postmodern position relies on legitimation that is specific to any given
language game, in opposition to the philosophical metanarratives that characterize the
modem period. Furthermore, these language games are constantly evolving; subject to
pragmatic rules, and no others.
1.4.2 Richard Rorty: Metaphor48
Like Lyotard, Rorty emphasizes the pragmatic evolution of language. He argues
that we must "abandon this project [of representationalism] and, with it, traditional
pretensions to a privileged cognitive role for philosophy."49 Moreover, he "sees no point
in seeking a non-representationalist basis for the justification or the truth of our
knowledge claims. It is enough to accept as justified beliefs those on which our
epistemic community agrees and to use 'true' as an honorific term for beliefs that we see
as 'justified to the hilt.' .',50 In other words, Rorty sides with Lyotard, in the claim that
legitimation resides within a specific language game. We have no need to look beyond
our epistemic community to determine that which constitutes knowledge. How, then,
does one decide between competing claims within a community? Taking his cue from
Nietzsche, Rorty points to the power of rhetoric and metaphor. In order to gain
47 Schrift, "Lyotard, Jean-Francois," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 523.
48 In identifying Richard Rorty as a "significant contributor to the postrnodem movement," (p. 21) I am
conceiving ofpostrnodernism rather broadly. In many instances, Rorty is defmed as a 'neo-pragmatist' or a
'contextual-pragmatist' (Benhabib). However, many of the feminist theorists whose work I employ
throughout this thesis, namely, Fraser and Nicholson, Di Stefano, Harding, as well as others prominent
theorists, including Susan Bordo in "Feminism, Postrnodemisrn, and Gender-Scepticism" and Nancy
Hartsock in "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?", all identify Rorty as a postrnodem thinker.
Magnus also refers to Rorty in his entry 'postrnodernism,' in the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 725.
49 Gutting, "Rorty, Richard," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 798.
50 Gutting, "Rorty, Richard," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 798.
24
knowledge, language constantly evolves according to pragmatic rules. The machinery
that propels language forward is, according to Rorty, metaphor.
All innovation, Rorty asserts, is born out of metaphor. We must agree, he
contends, "that the world does not provide us with any criterion of choice between
alternative metaphors, that we can only compare languages or metaphors with one
another, not with something beyond language called 'fact.'."Sl His evolutionary
approach attempts to show that "our language and our culture are as much a contingency,
as much a result of thousands of small mutations finding niches, ..as are the orchids and
the anthropoids."s2 Thus, ifwe find that certain segments of our language do not serve us
properly, then we will create new metaphors that help us to deal with the world. Indeed,
"To say that one's previous language was inappropriate for dealing with some segment of
the world.. .is just to say that one is now, having learned a new language, able to handle
that segment more easily."s3
Rorty believes that, "To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation,
is to say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are the effects of causes
which do not including human mental states."S4 Thus, our language is designed to
navigate this world. Over time, we slowly adjust our language so that it helps us to
function more appropriately in the world we inhabit. In this way, the goal of language is
not to match or accurately represent reality - this only works if one subscribes to the idea
that language is a medium. Rather, the goal of language is to better equip language-users
5\ Richard Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 20,
52 Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity 16.
53 Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity 14.
54 Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity 5.
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to function in their world. Rorty believes that no vocabulary is ever final, and that the
terms used to describe oneself and one's community are subject to change. However, the
goal of creating new vocabularies is not to have them more accurately represent the
world, as prescribed by modem, philosophical metanarratives. Rather, the evolution of
language is pragmatically determined.
Conclusion
The role that is played by the linguistic tum in the demise of the classical
episteme, and the consequent tum to postmodernism, cannot be underestimated.
Lyotard's agonistics of language and Rorty's metaphor are but two examples of the
overwhelming impact this new philosophical method has had on current modes of
thinking. The postmodern agenda has had far-reaching implications within philosophical
discourse, and beyond. One of the areas that has felt its impact most acutely has been
feminist theory. Chapter Two turns toward this complex issue in an attempt to delineate
the relationship between feminist theory and postmodernism.
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CHAPTER 2
POSTMODERNISM AND FEMINISM
The nagging question is whether the uncertain promise
ofa political linkage between feminism and
postmodernism is worth the attendent potential risks.
Christine Di Stefano, Dilemmas of Difference (77)
In Chapter One, I demonstrated the role played by the linguistic tum in the
development of the postmodem agenda. In Chapter Two, I will consider some of the
complexities within feminist theory's relationship to postmodemism. In order to
introduce this relationship, I will begin by outlining the roots of contemporary feminism
in very broad strokes. Then, I will explore the feminism-postrnodemism debate,
illustrating the central issues from three different angles. First, I will consider the
affinities of some feminist theorists for postmodemism. Second, I will discuss some
feminist quarrels with postmodemism, and finally, I will look at the work of some
feminist theorists who have tailored postmodem theory to suit their theoretical and socio-
political purposes. From this explication, I will move to Chapter Three, which begins
with an outline of the tensions revealed by these positions.
2.1 The History of Contemporary Feminisms
For the purposes of this Chapter, there are three major schools of feminist thought
to consider: liberal feminism, radical feminism, and cultural feminism. These divergent
schools provide a basic outline of the history of feminism's relationship to the modem
philosophical project. I provide this background because these three schools mirror the
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tensions inherent in recent philosophical thought. Indeed, it can be argued that the
progression of feminist thought from liberal through radical and on to cultural feminism
mirrors the progression in philosophy itself from modernity to postmodernism. As such,
it is a very good place to begin the examination of the relationship between feminism and
postmodernism.
2.1.1 Liberal Feminism
Liberal feminism, although this title was only assumed later, was instigated in the
eighteenth century by thinkers55 who took as their starting point the modern ideal of
universal reason. Liberal feminists point out that, within the modern philosophical
system, women were designated as irrational, and thus incapable of traditional rational
thought. Moreover, because the capacity for rational thought was used as the basis for
granting personhood, moral agency, and that which follows from these, such as property
and rights,56 women had no justifiable claim to any of these.
The female's association with body, emotion, nature, was seen as an impediment
to her ability to employ reason. Thus, liberal feminists fought - and in some cases, still
fight - for recognition as individuals who possess the sa,me type of, and comparable
ability for, reason as men. Christine Di Stefano describes the liberal feminist project as
follows: "Women have been unfairly excluded from the respect which they are due as
55 The name most commonly associated with the beginnings of liberal feminism is Mary Wollstonecraft
who, in A Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), argued that women ought to be educated in a
similar fashion as men, and would thus prove their ability for rational thought.
56 In The Man of Reason: "Male" & "Female" in Western Philosophy Genevieve Lloyd writes, "[Reason]
is incorporated not just into our criteria of truth, but also into our understanding of what it is to be a person
at all, of the requirements that must be met to be a good person, and of the proper relations between our
status as knowers and the rest of our lives."(xviii) Lloyd's work is an excellent resource to learn more
about the role of Reason in Western Philosophy. (Minnesota: Routledge, 1993)
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human beings on the basis of an insidious assumption that they are less rational and more
natural than men.,,57 Given the chance, women would be able to prove their rationality,
and those rights afforded to men could no longer be denied to the 'second sex.'
2.1.2 Radical Feminism
Instigated by the 1963 publication of The Feminine Mystique,58 a second wave of
feminism arose through consciousness-raising groups in the West. The radical
feminism59 that emerged from these discussions sought to determine the root cause of the
oppression of women. Both politically and theoretically, radical feminists identified
patriarchy as this root cause, and thus sought ways in which to undermine this societal
structure. In opposition to liberal feminists, radical feminists fight against the oppression
of patriarchy by problematizing reason, and seeking to revalorize the feminine. Thus,
rather than affirming the modern conception of a unitary and universal reason, they
emphasize a move away from reason entirely.
Radical feminists call for a revaluation of the "feminized irrational, invoking a
strong notion of difference against the gender-neutral pretensions of a rationalist
cuIture.,,60 The female association with body, emotion, nat!1re, was no longer seen as an
impediment to her ability to participate as a full and equal member of society, but rather
as something to be valued for its own sake. While some radical feminists insist that a
57 Christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodemism,"
FeminismIPostmodernism ed. Linda J. Nicholson. (New York: Routledge, 1990) 67.
58 In The Feminine Mystique (1963) Betty Friedan argued that countless American women were
experiencing "the problem that has no name," due, in part, to their roles as wives and mothers.
59 Prominent radical feminist theorists and activists include Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon,
Susan Brownmiller, and Mary Daly.
60 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismIPostmodernism 67.
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separate society for women must be created in order to accomplish these goals, more
generally, the radical feminist project would ideally result in a society that accommodates
- even celebrates - women in their feminized difference.
However, the second wave of feminism underwent a great deal of change within
the short span of twenty to thirty years. In fact, we see that contemporary feminist
thought through the last decades of the twentieth century underwent similar changes to
those which took hundreds of years for philosophical thought to experience. While
traditional modern thought "produced no self-generated practice of self-interrogation and
critique of its racial, class, and gender biases...contemporary feminism has been
unusually attuned to issues of exclusion and invisibility.,,61 So attuned, in fact, that not
long after the emergence of the second wave in the 1960s, both liberal and radical
feminisms came under attack for their biases. The identification of the biases within
second wave feminist thought led to the emergence of cultural feminism. The most
distinguishing characteristic of cultural feminism is its conceptual shift away from
essentialism and toward experience. While liberal and radical feminisms based their
arguments for female liberation upon a conception of woman as an essential category,
cultural feminism turned to the fragmented, empirical experience ofwomen.
2.1.3 Cultural Feminism
Cultural feminists62 contend that the liberal and radical feminists' search for a
foundation upon which the oppression of women could be described invariably left out
61 Susan Bordo, "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism," FeminismIPostmodemism ed.
Linda J. Nicholson. (New York: Routledge, 1990) 141.
62 Prominent cultural feminist theorists and activists include ben hooks, Audre Lorde, and Chandra
Mohanty.
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the experience of many women. Both liberal and radical feminisms were identified as
too white-centered, heterosexist, and middle-class. Thus, these feminist arguments
"hamper rather than promote sisterhood, since they elide differences among women and
among the forms of sexism to which different women are differentially subject.,,63
Therefore, because liberal and radical feminists generally fail to address the multiple axes
of identity that inflect gender relations, cultural feminists try to offer a more complex
understanding of identity, and thus a more complex version of feminist theory and
activism.
Through the work of various cultural feminists, criticisms of mainstream feminist
arguments have gained currency, and "poor and working-class women, women of color,
and lesbians have finally won a wider hearing for their objections to feminist theories
which fail to illuminate their lives and address their problems."64 However, the concerns
of cultural feminism not only brought out the inadequacies of liberal and radical feminist
theories, but also consequently dictated the need for a new basis for feminist politics. If
women's emancipation could not be gained by arguments for her rationality, or by a
revaluation of the feminine, then what theory could achieve this goal?
We shall see that the cultural feminist turn away from essentialism and toward
experience nudged feminist theory toward postmodernism. However, determining
whether any given feminist perspective is more closely akin to modernity or to
postmodernism is a challenging task. Within liberal and radical critiques, the traditional
63 Nancy Fraser and Linda J. Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter between
Feminism and Postmodernism," Feminism/Postmodemism ed. Linda J. Nicholson. (New York:
Routledge, 1990)33.
64 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernisrn, 33.
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concepts of truth, knowledge, power, history, self and language were called into question
because of their androcentric biases. Yet the move from a call to maintain the concepts
while making them more inclusive, to a call to rid ourselves of the concepts altogether is
a move that requires careful investigation.
Thus, feminism remains in a relation of ambivalence to both the modern and
postmodern projects. On the one hand, contemporary feminism's critique of the modern
can be seen as a generating force in the transition from modernity to postmodernism. It is
certainly true that "the force of postmodern critiques can perhaps best be seen in some of
the challenges of feminist theory...and gender theory generally. For it is in gender theory
that the conception of 'reason' itself as it has functioned in the shared philosophical
tradition is redescribed as a conception that, it is often argued, is (en)gendered,
patriarchal, homophobic, and deeply optional.,,65 Yet on the other hand, contemporary
feminist thought can be seen as a movement that has 'piggy-backed' on the postmodern
cause, adopting its stance as its own. The postmodern problematization of the self, of
history, and of metaphysics, has certainly been commensurate with some of feminist
theory's own critical moves. However, while the matter of historical precedence is
certainly worthy of consideration, it is not my intention to discuss it here. Rather, I will
look at the more substantive issue of the theoretical relationship between feminist and
postmodemist theories.
In order to outline the complexities of this matter, I will investigate the tense
relationship between the two theoretical movements. I will examine, in tum, the
65 Magnus, "postrnodem," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 726.
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affinities felt for postmodernism by feminism, some feminist quarrels with
postmodernism, and lastly, selected interpretations of what a postmodern feminism would
look like. I will use six different authors to circumscribe the debate: Nancy Fraser, Linda
J. Nicholson, Jane Flax, Christine Di Stefano, Sandra Harding, and Seyla Benhabib, some
of whom wish to ally with the postmodern cause, and others who remain suspicious of
the postmodern enterprise. With reference to these feminist views, I will exhibit the
tensions that can be found among them. In Chapter Three, I shall more fully consider
these tensions in order to demonstrate the way in which an understanding of the linguistic
tum will help to resolve them.
2.2 Feminist Affinities for Postmodernism
Both feminists and postmodernists have as their founding principle the critique of
modem thought, and thus it is no surprise that they have similar concerns regarding
modernity. However, the similarities between postmodernism and feminism lie not in
their results or in their methods of critique, which tend to vary greatly, but rather in that
which is called into question. Postmodernists and feminists often bring their
investigations into common content to very different conclusions. Yet this does not
mitigate the importance of their similarities of focus, which are outlined by Seyla
Benhabib in Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism.
Benhabib's survey of the similar critical orientations of postmodernism and
feminism builds upon Jane Flax's characterization of the postmodern position.
According to Flax, "one of the most important [postmodernist] claims is that Western
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culture is about to experience or has already experienced, but has been denying, an
interrelated series of deaths. These include the deaths of Man, History, and
Metaphysics.,,66 To these three theses, Benhabib adds the feminist counterpoints, which
she refers to as 'the demystification of the male subject of reason,' 'the engendering of
historical narrative,' and 'feminist skepticism toward the claims of transcendent reason.'
I will examine each of these themes in tum.
2.2.1 The Death of Man - The Demystification of the Male Subject of Reason
The postmodemist, Flax points out, contends that "Man is forever caught in the
web of fictive meaning, in chains of signification, in which the subject is merely another
position in language.,,67 In other words, the postmodemists contend that the subject is a
part of the very discourse of which it was previously thought to be the detached and
independent creator. Indeed, they argue that, since the fundamental re-orientation of
thought generated by Descartes, modem philosophy has been under the spell of a
fictitious subject. On the postmodem account then, this Cartesian subject is exposed as
an effect of discourse that is necessarily embedded in a particular social, temporal or
linguistic context. Thus, the self is not autonomous because she cannot take up a
detached standpoint; she has "no pure reason or constituting consciousness with
independent, nonlinguistic, or nonhistorical access to the Real or Being of the World.,,68
Contemporary feminism also takes exception to the modem account of the
subject. The feminist version of the Death of Man thesis stresses that the modem subject,
66 Flax, Thinking Fragments 32.
67 Flax, Thinking Fragments 32.
68 Flax, Thinking Fragments 33.
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once thought to be representative of human beings as such, is not only influenced by
historical, social, linguistic and cultural practices, but also by gender. That is, while the
postmodemist maintains that the subject is an effect of discourse, feminists further point
out that the subject also reflects the gender relations that are found in any given culture,
society, period, or language. As Benhabib states, "feminists claim that 'gender' and the
various practices contributing to its constitution are one of the most crucial contexts in
which to situate the purportedly neutral and universal subject of reason.,,69 Thus, the
subject of modem thought is no longer autonomous, removed from both time and place.
Furthermore, the subject is no longer universal. Instead, the subject is located both in the
world, and in the body, and is constituted by those very practices that it was once
understood to have created. While the postmodemist subject views the world from a
culturally and historically determined location, the feminist postmodemist subject also
approaches the world from a point of view that includes gender. The impact of gender
must not be underestimated, feminists point out, in determining the identity of the
subject.
2.2.2 The Death of History - The Engendering of Historical Narrative
The postmodemist critique of modem thought contends that "Man constructs
stories he calls History in order to find or justify a place for himself within time.,,7o
Within modem thought, History is thought to possess an inner logic or order, and this
logic involves a "pregiven goal toward which Man is steadily moving."71 In other words,
69 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodemism," Situating the Self 212.
70 Flax, Thinking Fragments 33.
71 Flax, Thinking Fragments 33.
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the modem philosopher imposes a logical progression on the passage of time, which is
understood as existing for the sole purpose of realizing a specific, predetermined goal.
Within this story or 'master narrative,' Man is understood to be the Hero around whom
the progression of history revolves. As Flax points out, "This goal or purpose is meant
for Man; it expresses or realizes him at his best. The closer he comes to it, the closer he
comes to himself, to his essence."n For example, the coming to self-consciousness of
freedom, or the ultimate goal of achieving a communist state, are expressions of the role
played by man within the world.
In opposition to the modem understanding of History, postmodemists point out
that this view of history requires identifying the essence of humanity. Whether it be
reason, freedom, or the capacity to labour, the purpose of Man and of History is to come
closer to and reveal his authentic reality. Not only do postmodemists take exception to
the ideal of essential human nature that is inextricably linked to the modem view of
History, but, more importantly, they disagree with its teleological nature. That is,
postmodemists insist that History, understood as a teleological metanarrative, is no
longer feasible. In place of the modem view of History, they advocate a micro-social,
genealogical understanding of history, which creates analyses that do not transcend any
given historical, cultural or discursive location. With this new understanding of history,
postmodemists aim to circumvent issues that accompany the modem reliance upon the
ideals of unity, homogeneity, and closure. Postmodemists argue that "Any appearance of
72 Flax, Thinking Fragments 33.
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unity presupposes and requires a prior act of violence.,,73 That is, the structured
appearance of History espoused by modem philosophy entails the suppression of
alternate stories.
The feminist counterpoint to the postmodern Death of History is 'the engendering
of historical narrative.' This theoretical concern centers around what is seen as the
problematic equation of male and universal. The feminist critique of the modem view of
History raises the point that this history has been, literally, 'his story.' It is clear that
those who have traditionally written and analyzed history have been "white, propertied,
Christian, male head[s] ofhousehold.,,74 Thus, these individuals have had the privileged
position of dictating the progression and purpose of History for all people. Indeed, the
stories we have heard and that have been laid out for us have been theirs. Quite often, we
see that women are altogether left out of these master narratives, relegated to the margins,
and doomed to watch time march by. Furthermore, this desire for a united, homogeneous
and linear understanding of history has typically silenced alternate stories. As Benhabib
points out, "until very recently neither did women have their own history, their own
narrative with different categories of periodization ~d with different structural
regularities.,,75 We see that the goal of the engendering of historical narrative mirrors,
once again, the liberaVradicaVcultural feminist debate. While liberal feminists advocate
including women within the dominant metanarrative, radical feminists argue for a parallel
narrative that accounts for women's experience, while cultural (and postmodern)
73 Flax, Thinking Fragments 33.
74 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 212.
75 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 213.
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feminists insist upon the elimination of metanarratives altogether in favour of multiple,
local narratives.
2.2.3 The Death of Metaphysics - Feminist Skepticism Toward the Claims of
Transcendent Reason
As I described in Chapter One, the modem philosophical project sought to
overcome the schism between subject and object, and thereby understand how knowledge
of the external world was possible. In response to this question, the episteme of
representation was developed, which defined "knowledge as representation, according to
which the subject stands over against an independent world of objects that it can more or
less accurately represent.,,76 Philosophy thus became the adjudicator of knowledge
claims, attaining a privileged position in relation to the empirical sciences because of its
ability to define what did and did not count as knowledge.
The view of philosophy as the adjudicator of knowledge claims, or as the
discourse of legitimation, comes under attack from postmodern critics. They insist that
"philosophy is necessarily a fictive, nonrepresentational activity,"?? which can make no
claim to representing reality. Postmodernists argue that "There is no way to test whether
one story is closer to the truth than another because there is no transcendental
standpoint.,,78 Thus, as Lyotard and Rorty conclude, legitimation must descend to the
micro-social level and decisions must be pragmatically determined within a given
context.
76 Baynes, "General Introduction," After Philosophy: End or Transformation? 4-5.
77 Flax, Thinking Fragments 37.
78 Flax, Thinking Fragments 37.
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The feminist counterpoint to the Death of Metaphysics thesis brings to awareness
the possibility that, if the content of philosophy is not a priori or present to be discovered,
then it must be imbued with the particular interests possessed by the creator(s). That is,
philosophy must always be perspectival. As Benhabib explains, "activities of [the]
subject bear in every instance the marks of the context out of which they emerge, [and]
the subject of philosophy is inevitably embroiled with knowledge-governing interests
which mark and direct its activities.,,79 The interests of the subject involved with
philosophical inquiry become guiding principles in determining both the content and
form of knowledge. This is of particular importance to feminists, who contend that
gender relations and differences are some of the key interests that become involved in the
creation of philosophy. Moreover, because modem philosophy was dominated by men, it
was thus imbued with their interests.
2.3 Feminist Quarrels with Postmodernism
As we have seen, there are many similarities between the feminist and
postmodernist critiques of modem thought. However, despite these commonalities, many
feminists have been hesitant to identify with the postmodem cause. Indeed, several
feminist theorists have argued that these similarities are simply not sufficient to create a
close alliance between the two theoretical movements. While hesitancy on the feminist
side does not necessarily indicate a complete rejection of postmodemism (this will be
79 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 213.
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discussed further in the section 2.4), there are several points of contention around which
feminist theorists revolve. Rosemarie Tong summarizes this in the following passage:
As attractive as the postmodern feminist approach to philosophy may
be, some feminist philosophers worry that an overemphasis on difference
and a rejection of unity may lead to intellectual as well as political dis-
integration. If feminist philosophy is to be without any standpoint what-
soever, it becomes difficult to ground claims about what is good for
women in particular and for human beings in general. It is a major
challenge to contemporary feminist philosophy, therefore, to reconcile
the pressures for diversity and difference with those for integration and
commonality.80
As this quote reveals, the political dimension of feminism adds another level of
complexity to the feminist-postmodernist debate. While postmodernism is often heralded
as a blessing to feminist theory qua theory, feminism's sociopolitical goals tend to be
threatened by the claims of postmodern theory. This is a recurring theme in the feminist-
postmodernist debate, and will be evident in my discussions that follow. In order to flesh
out this perspective, I will look at three authors: Di Stefano, Harding, and Benhabib, all
of whom express profound skepticism regarding the supposed promise of postmodernism
for feminist theory.
2.3.1 Christine OJ Stefano: The Political Subject
Di Stefano, in Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and
Postmodernism, attempts to weigh the merits and risks of a political linkage between
feminism and postmodernism. She points out that it was modernism's portrayal of
sociopolitical arrangements that created the space required for the feminist identification
of gender as a category worthy of critique. Modem theorists' sociopolitical arrangements
40
typically relied upon strictly defined, naturally based sex roles. Yet the work of early
feminist critics separated these biological differences (sex) from culturally-instituted or
socially-constructed differences (gender). However, once the category of gender was
identified, the next challenge to be faced was to detennine precisely how basic gender
differences were.
In order to explicate the various perspectives that emerge from this question, Di
Stefano provides an account of the divergent streams of feminist thought (liberal, radical
and cultural) in accordance with gender relations. She identifies liberal feminists as
individuals who do not perceive gender as being basic in a fundamentally constitutive
way. Thus, these individuals will search for a politics that transcends gender difference.
This theory is opposed to that of the radical feminists, who view gender differences as
being significantly basic, and who will "pursue a politics of difference which can speak
to women's alienated...but also potentially critical identity.,,81 However, gender itself
came under scrutiny by cultural feminists, and it was charged as "a disastrous and
oppressive fiction, the fiction of 'woman,' which runs roughshod over multiple
differences among and within women.,,82
However, Di Stefano also points out that the theoretical and nonnative elements
of gender relations play an important role in the development of feminist theory
alongside the empirical aspect. Moreover, this theoretical/nonnative element cannot be
deduced from or resolved by empirical strategies. Feminist theory asks not only how
80 Rosemarie Tong, "feminist philosophy," The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy second edition, ed.
Robert Audi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 306.
81 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismIPostmodemism 65.
82 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismIPostmodemism 65.
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basic gender differences are, but "how basic we want them to be for particular purposes
and ends.,,83 That is, in order to embrace a feminist politics, feminist theory must decide
how the concept of gender relations will be employed - and given "their tenacious
rootedness in an objective world created over time and deeply resistant to change,,,84 Di
Stefano suggests that gender relations is a concept that requires constant and repeated
attention.
Di Stefano's quarrel with postmodernism is revealed by her warning that the
cultural feminist call to overcome gender in favour of a proliferation of differences
entails the denial of the subject. She argues that postmodemism is detrimental to the
normative goals of feminism because of its denial of a subject and of a standpoint.
Postmodemism, she claims, is "entrenched in the dilemmas of difference.,,85 In liberal
feminism, gender differences are subsumed under the masculine universal and, in effect,
she becomes he. In radical feminism, the feminine is revalorized, but not criticized.
Thus, she must remain as a she who has no means to remove herself from an imposed
femininity. However, postmodemism does not remove us from this problematic
dichotomy. In postmodemism, the female subject simpl){ "dissolves into a perplexing
plurality of differences, none of which can be theoretically or politically privileged over
others.,,86 When this happens, feminist politics becomes impossible.87 She argues that
To the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific constituency or
83 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 66.
84 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 78.
85 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 77.
86 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 77.
87 This becomes an issue not only for feminist politics, but for any political movement that is defined by
identity, including, for example, the civil or gay rights movements.
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subject, namely, women, the postmodemist prohibition against subject-centered
inquiry and theory undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based organized
movement dedicated to articulating and implementing the goals of such a
constituency.88
Di Stefano's argument points to one of the central problems encountered by postmodem
feminism, which is the apparent inability to create a coherent political movement upon
the deconstruction of categories. The move from identity to difference, from unity to
multiplicity, throws the concept of a unified movement into doubt. With an emphasis on
difference rather than unity, the idea of a woman's movement becomes suspect. Indeed,
if the boundaries of categories are easily transgressed, if identity can be 'played with', as
it were, then for whom does feminism fight? Without groups, and specifically a group
known as 'woman' which can be demonstrated as being oppressed, the idea of feminism
is rendered pointless.
2.3.2 Sandra Harding: Feminist Science Projects
Like Di Stefano, Sandra Harding offers a skeptical view of the promise of
postmodemism. In Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, Harding
argues that feminism can and does take advantage of both Enlightenment and postmodem
agendas. She believes that the feminist ambivalence surrounding science and
epistemology is a positive program, identifying the "sometimes conflicting, legitimate
political and theoretical needs of women today.,,89 Thus, Harding invokes feminist
empiricism and feminist standpoint theory as examples of theories that are uniquely
situated in 'no man's land,' between the modem and postmodem. These theories provide
88 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 76.
89 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postmodernism 86.
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a way of attending to these conflicting needs, while still providing a basis for action
within the feminist movement. Like all justificatory strategies, these theories arose in
response to the need for a basis on which to make choices in theory, research and politics.
The two approaches differ insofar as feminist empiricism seeks to develop and refine the
ideal of objectivity that is necessitated by the traditional scientific method, while
standpoint theory alters the traditional scientific method by imposing historical principles
of inquiry. In both cases, Harding asserts that their uniquely feminist approach can be
used specifically to direct struggles to eliminate the oppression of women.
Feminist empiricists identify the underlying problematic of science as, quite
simply, poorly done science. From the identification and articulation of scientific
problems to the design and interpretation of data, the traditional scientific enterprise is
fraught with androcentric biases. In order to eliminate these biases, feminist empiricists
seek stricter adherence to existing scientific methods. In revealing these biases, feminist
empiricists "make it possible for people to see the world in an enlarged perspective
because they remove the covers and blinders that obscure knowledge and observation.,,90
Thus, while the women's movement created new conditio~s under which science could
be practiced, the norms and principles of scientific inquiry remain the same. Indeed, "the
social values and political agendas of feminists raise new issues, enlarge the scope of
inquiry, and reveal cause for greater care in the conduct ofresearch.,,91
Because feminist empiricism embraces rather than challenges the paradigm of
90 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Ferninism/Postmodernism, 91.
91 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Ferninism/Postmodemism, 92.
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objective science, it does not obviously enter into the terrain of the postmodern.
However, Harding points out that the feminist empiricist is also in tension with traditional
scientific assumptions, because of her claim that the researcher's location in history
enables her to produce less biased research. That is, the feminist empiricist assertion that
it is possible to produce less biased research while being located in history, is clearly in
tension with Enlightenment understandings of science and objectivity, which declare that
the ideal knower must be ahistorical. As Harding states, "Feminist empiricism holds on
to the idea that a goal of science is to produce less biased, more objective claims, but it
also insists on what is overtly forbidden in empiricism - the importance of analyzing and
assigning different epistemological values to the social identities of inquirers."n Thus,
feminist empiricism is clearly situated between modernity and postmodernism. While
this feminist science project insists that science is capable of, and ought to continue
seeking "less biased, more objective claims," feminist empiricism cannot be understood
as simply carrying on the androcentric scientific project as defined within modem
philosophy.
As she does with feminist empiricism, Harding places feminist standpoint theory
between modernity and postmodernism. However, feminist standpoint theory is much
more dramatically and self-consciously situated than feminist empiricism. While
feminist empiricism raises the question of the historically situated knowing subject,
standpoint theory pushes this idea to more radical conclusions. This feminist science
project argues that those who belong to a socially or politically marginalized group are
92 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," FeminismIPostrnodernism 93.
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able to take up an epistemically privileged position. Thus, "standpoint theory explicitly
articulates, develops, and pushes to more radical conclusions the anti-Enlightenment
tendencies that were only implicit in feminist empiricism.,,93
The knowing subject of feminist standpoint theory is located on the margins of a
dominant society, and thus has privileged insight into both her own world, and into the
dominant society from which she is excluded. Thus, "what is a disadvantage in terms of
their oppression can become an advantage in terms of science.,,94 In other words,
women, because of their marginalized status, are able to apply to the objects of scientific
inquiry, new and unique concepts arising from their uniquely gendered experiences. That
is, by critically engaging with one's gendered experiences as well as the broader social
contexts in which they occur, one can occupy the feminist standpoint. The value that is
placed upon the situatedness of the knowing subject within feminist standpoint theory is
unquestionably much more radical than that forwarded by feminist empiricism.
Therefore, it is also much more akin to postmodemism and its criticisms of traditional
science. However, it does not completely take leave of traditional Enlightenment
assumptions insofar as it still has as its goal the accumulati,?n of knowledge, and the use
of this knowledge for political ends.
2.3.3 Seyla Benhabib: The Value of Metaphysics
Like Harding, Benhabib shares the ambivalence felt by feminists regarding
modernity. In Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism, she writes, "women cannot
93 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postrnodemism, 97.
94 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postrnodernism, 98.
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but have an ambivalent relationship to modernity, which on the one hand promises them
so much and which yet on the other constantly subverts its own promesse du bonheur.,,95
However, she maintains that this ambivalence is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
reason to invoke a postmodern position. Indeed, such a move would be disastrous, since
postmodernism "is not only incompatible with but would undermine the very possibility
of feminism as the theoretical articulation of the emancipatory aspirations of women.,,96
Benhabib underwrites this claim by explicating the outcomes of the three
postmodern theses - the death of Man97, History and Metaphysics (as found in section
2.2). She contends that strong versions of the three theses, thought through to their
conclusions, threaten the efficacy - even the possibility - of a movement based on the
goal of female emancipation. However, despite this gloomy forecast of the 'promise' of
postmodernism, Benhabib also formulates weakened versions of the three postmodern
theses - versions that are more congenial to the feminist cause. Yet we will see that even
these milder versions still pose a threat to feminist political practice.
In its strong version, the postmodern Death of the Subject thesis anticipates the
utter dissolution of the subject. When the self simply becomes another position in
language or a series of performances (Butler)98, she avoids creative responsibility.
Without creative responsibility, it becomes impossible to act as an "accountable
95 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 17.
96 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 229.
97 Throughout her essay "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Benhabib refers to the
postmodem 'Death of Man' as the postmodem 'Death of the Subject' as well. Thus, I will also be using
these two phrases interchangeably.
98 Judith Butler argues that gender achieves the appearance of normalcy only through repetitive
performance. See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity (London:
Routledge, 1990)
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participant in the community of discourse and inquiry.,,99 Indeed, how does one maintain
the ability to reflect upon and creatively alter a discourse if one is mired within it?
Ultimately, this ability is the foundation of all communication and social action and, most
importantly, the foundation of the normative vision of feminism. Thus, it is clear that the
strong version of the Death of the Subject is incommensurable with feminism.
However, Benhabib's formulation of a weak version of the Death of the Subject
thesis allows space for feminist political practice to continue. The weak version of this
thesis entails the radical situatedness of the subject. That is, the subject retains the
traditional attributes of autonomy and rationality, while taking account of her situatedness
within social and linguistic practices.
The strong version of the postmodem Death of History entails a complete
rejection o~ any narrative that seeks to explain things beyond the micro-social level.
Thus, the postmodem death of History "occludes the epistemological interest in history
and in historical narrative which accompany the aspirations of all struggling historical
actors."IOO Because postmodemism focuses on micro- rather than macro-social practices,
the ability to examine or theorize about lengthy historical narratives is undermined. By
way of criticizing this strong version, Benhabib poses for us an essential question: "Is it
possible for struggling groups not to interpret history in light of a moral-political
imperative, namely, the imperative of the future interest in emancipation?"lOI When the
normative interests of feminism are employed as a lens through which the past is to be
99 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodemism," Situating the Self 216.
100 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 220.
101 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self, 220.
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interpreted, issues that have traditionally been erased or devalued receive new
importance. Because the postmodern death of History impedes rather than aids this
process, it becomes evident that the strong version is a detriment to feminist political
practice.
The weak version of the Death of History thesis, on the other hand, allows room
for narratives that transcend the local to take into account open-ended questions of
scientific inquiry. Benhabib insists that it is up to the social scientist to determine the
scope of inquiry based upon the task at hand. Yet at the same time, the "call to end the
practice of 'grand narratives' which are essentialist and monocausal"lo2 is maintained,
and thus no group can claim to represent the forces of History. In other words, grand
political movements will be rejected outright, as it is clear that no group can claim
knowledge of the goal or forces of historical progression, and can therefore not act
according to them.
Finally, Benhabib turns to the strong version of the postmodern Death of
Metaphysics, which is exemplified by the work of Jacques Derrida. According to this
line of critique, "Western metaphysics has been under the spell of the 'metaphysics of
presence' at least since Plato."J03 Benhabib argues that this critique "itself proceeds
under the spell of a meta-narrative."J04 This meta-narrative, she maintains, is essentially
a straw man, because the postmodern "characterization of the philosophical tradition
102 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 219.
103 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism," Situating the Self 223. Derrida develops
his critique of Western metaphysics out of Heidegger's work on the 'metaphysics of presence.' See
footnote 20 for a more detailed description of Heidegger's position.
104 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 223.
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allows postmodemists the rhetorical advantage of presenting what they are arguing
against in its least defensible versions.,,105 To present modem metaphysics as a
monolithic and essentialist movement that merely emphasizes the privileged position of
philosophy in relation to the Real is a faulty starting point. That is, the understanding of
modem philosophy as perpetuating a fonn of naIve realism simply glosses over the many
conflicting and contradictory philosophical systems developed by, for example, Hobbes,
Kant, and Hegel. Thus, Benhabib maintains that the postrnodem meta-narrative ignores
the complexities and nuances of modem philosophy. She concludes that reducing
modem philosophy to a very specific and undesirable relationship to the Real renders
those conceptual schemes unrecognizable and useless, and that which is valuable must be
discarded with the rest.
Benhabib also discusses a weak version of the postmodem Death of Metaphysics,
which she attributes to Richard Rorty.lo6 Rorty equates modem philosophy with
epistemology, and argues that philosophy should no longer be viewed as "a
metadiscourse of legitimation, articulating the criteria of validity presupposed by all other
discourses.",o7 However, Benhabib insists that, because this epistemological role is the
defining feature of modem philosophy, once it is denied, "philosophy loses its raison
d'etre."lo8 That is, the weak version of the postmodem Death of Metaphysics would see
philosophy eliminated altogether. Thus, Benhabib asserts that even the weak version of
105 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 223.
106 I will not revisit Rorty's position in detail at this point. Refer to section 1.4.2 for a description of his
fo~Si~~~:~~~~~~=~::~t~~~~~~S~tion ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 224.
108 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism," Situating the Self 224.
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the postmodem Death of Metaphysics spells the end of social criticism. Because
feminism relies upon justificatory strategies beyond the micro-social and ad hoc criticism
offered by the postmodemist, the end of philosophy necessarily implies the end of
feminism as social critic as well.
Benhabib argues that "[s]ocial criticism without some form of philosophy is not
possible, and without social criticism the project of a feminist theory which is at once
committed to knowledge and to the emancipatory interests of women in
inconceivable."lo9 Thus, we see that Benhabib's examination of the postmodem Death of
Metaphysics thesis amounts to a discrediting of the feminist goal of allying with
postmodemism. As she points out, "Postmodemism, in its infinitely skeptical and
subversive attitude toward normative claims, institutional justice and political struggles,
is certainly refreshing. Yet, it is also debilitating."llo
2.4 Postmodern Feminisms
Thus, we see that there is a great deal of tension in feminist literature when it
comes to postmodemism. Some advocate an alliance between the two theoretical
movements, while others argue that such an alliance is impossible. However, the
sympathies between the two movements simply cannot be ignored, and it is this fact that
has caused many feminist theorists to articulate a very specific formulation of
'postmodem feminism,' in which postmodem claims are tailored to suit the normative,
109 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 225.
110 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Situating the Self 15.
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institutional and political needs of feminism. I will briefly outline two of these
formulations, articulated by Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson's Social Criticism
without Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, I I I and Jane
Flax in Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory.
2.4.1 Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson: Postmodern Feminist Theory
Fraser and Nicholson have together authored a much-cited version of postmodem
feminism. They contend that both postmodemism and feminism "have sought to develop
new paradigms of social criticism which do not rely on traditional philosophical
underpinnings.,,112 However, postmodemists make the mistake of focusing too much on
issues found within the philosophical realm, thus threatening the efficacy of social
criticism, while feminists tend to focus too much upon social criticism, often lapsing into
problematic philosophical tendencies. Thus, FraserlNicholson contend that an alliance of
the two movements would allow for their complementarity to emerge.
In order to maintain the force of social criticism found within feminism, and the
skepticism regarding essentialism and metanarratives found within postmodemism, they
contend that "postmodem-feminist theory would be pragmatic and fallibilistic. It would
tailor its methods and categories to the specific task at hand, using multiple categories
when appropriate and forswearing the meta-physical comfort of a single feminist method
or feminist epistemology.,,113 In other words, such a theory would not search for an
essence or universal feature of womanhood to be used as a basis for the criticism of
III For ease of reading, I will be using 'FraserlNicholson' to designate the article co-authored by Nancy
Fraser and Linda Nicholson.
112 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodemism 19.
113 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Ferninism/Postmodemism 35.
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gender relations. Rather, categories of criticism would be "inflected by temporality, with
historically specific institutional categories like the modem, restricted, male-headed,
nuclear family taking precedence over ahistorical, functionalist categories like
reproduction and mothering.,,114
They argue that "postmodern feminists need not abandon the large theoretical
tools needed to address large political problems. There is nothing self-contradictory in
the idea of a postmodern theory."IIS The integral difference in this position is that these
theoretical tools will not be based on modem conceptions of universality or essences.
Rather, they will be "explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity of different
societies and periods and to that of different groups within societies and periods ... [and
categories] would be genealogized, that is, framed by a historical narrative and rendered
temporally and culturally specific.,,116
2.4.2 Jane Flax: Gender Relations
Like Fraser/Nicholson, Flax constructs a postmodern feminist theory in
Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory. From the very outset of her
analysis, Flax identifies feminist theory as a type of postmodern philosophy, because it
reveals and contributes to the growing uncertainty within
Western intellectual circles about the appropriate grounding
and methods for explaining and interpreting human experience.
Contemporary feminists join other postmodern philosophers
in raising important metatheoretical questions about the possible
nature and status of theorizing itself. I I?
114 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodemism, 34.
115 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism, 34.
116 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodemism 34.
117 Jane Flax, "Postmodemism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory," Feminism/Postmodemism, ed.
Linda J. icholson. (New York: Routledge, 1990) 40-41.
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Thus, while feminist theorists may feel an affinity for the logical, ordered world of
Enlightenment thought, their profound critique of this very world demonstrates that
feminist theory more closely resembles and is more appropriately associated with
postmodemism.
Flax also categorizes feminist theory as a form of social criticism. Gender
relations, as the central object of feminist theorizing, becomes the site of the meeting of
feminism as social criticism and feminism as postmodem philosophy. Yet 'gender
relations' is itself a complex set of social processes that is not easily analyzed. Even the
existence of gender relations was typically concealed by modem thought, until it was
problematized by feminist theorists. Thus, because gender relations vary across culture
and time, the criticism of these structures must be attuned to cultural and historical
variability. The tendency to reduce the complexities of gender to simple, unified wholes
for explanatory purposes hides the "permeability and pervasiveness of gender relations
and the need for new sorts of theorizing."tt8 This variability, permeability, and
pervasiveness all contribute to the need for us to understand that there is no such category
as 'woman,' apart from specific time, location and context.
Moreover, because 'woman' exists only as part of gender relations, "none of us
can speak for 'woman' because no such person exists except within a specific set of
(already gendered) relations - to 'man' and to many concrete and different women."tt9 A
postmodem feminist theory must therefore take account of this vast array of differences,
118 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," FeminismlPostmodernism 53.
119 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," FeminismIPostmodernism 56.
54
and "should encourage us to tolerate and interpret ambivalence, ambiguity, and
multiplicity as well as to expose the roots of our needs for imposing order and structure
no matter how arbitrary and oppressive these needs may be.,,120
Conclusion
The relationship between feminism and postmodernism is clearly fraught with
tension. It remains true that there are certain similarities between the two theoretical
movements. Yet whether this is a sufficient cause for feminists to ally with the
postmodern cause remains to be seen, since both theoretical and political concerns come
to the forefront when the concepts of the subject, of history, and of metaphysics are
called into question. Chapter Three turns to an examination of the tensions revealed by
the works discussed in this Chapter, then draws together Chapters One and Two to
consider how a clearer understanding of the linguistic tum's role in the development of
postmodernism can help to alleviate some of these tensions.
120 Flax, "Postmodemism and Gender Relations," FeminismlPostmodemism 56.
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CHAPTER 3
FEMINISM AND THE LINGUISTIC TURN
What began as an exchange about feminism and postmodernism
has turned largely into a dispute about how best to interpret the
linguistic turn. This development is not surprising. Feminists,
like other theorists, work today in a context marked by the
problematization oflanguage.
Fraser, Pragmatism Feminism and the Linguistic Tum (157)
The goal of Chapter One was to identify and define the linguistic tum and to
demonstrate the role it played in the development of the postmodem agenda. Chapter
Two sought to outline the complexities of the relationship between feminism and
postmodemism. Chapter Three will bring these two chapters together by discussing the
role of the linguistic tum within this relationship. What I hope to make clear is that an
examination of the linguistic tum within the context of the feminist-postmodernist debate
will shed light on the difficulties that have plagued the relationship from its very outset.
According to Rorty, linguistic philosophy is "the most recent philosophical
revolution,..121 yet very few feminists have directly engaged with linguistic philosophy.
In this chapter, I seek to open up this dialogue in order to determine the potential
that such an analysis may hold. I begin by rendering explicit the tensions that were only
implicit in the exegesis of various feminist positions provided in Chapter Two. Then, I
take these tensions and examine each in relation to the linguistic tum, arguing that a clear
understanding of the linguistic tum's impact on the current philosophical environment
will mitigate some of the difficulties in the feminist-postmodernist debate. An analysis of
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the linguistic turn reveals that those feminist theorists who advocate an alliance with
postmodernism do not go far enough. In some cases, they have made the linguistic turn,
but wrongfully equate this move with taking up a postmodern position. In other cases,
those feminist theorists who advocate an alliance with postmodernism, have not even
made the linguistic turn. By examining the tensions in light of the imperatives of the
linguistic turn, we see that some feminist theorists who critique feminism for retaining
modern assumptions, fall victim to this very tendency themselves.
3.1 Tensions
The key issue that contemporary feminist theorists must face is that, within the
current philosophical context, it seems to be the case that one can be neither completely
pro- nor completely anti-postmodern. If these theorists consider postmodernism to be
irrelevant, useless, or even harmful, then they risk ignoring the findings that cultural
feminists have brought to the foreground. Thus, a strictly anti-postmodernist position
runs the risk of undermining feminist political practice insofar as such a position does not
pay sufficient attention to the difficulties of difference. On the other hand, if one takes up
a postmodern stance, one risks undermining the normative goals and transformative
power of feminism due to a lack of justificatory strategies. Thus, those who wish to ally
with postmodernism also run the risk of undermining feminist political practice. This
tense relationship between feminism and postmodernism is perhaps best characterized as
\2\ Rorty, "Introduction: The Linguistic Tum 3.
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a love-hate relationship. While postmodernism promises so much, it also threatens to
take so much away.
This over-arching difficulty has three more specific dimensions that are taken up by
feminist theorists. I maintain that the debate among feminist theorists mirrors the three
postmodern deaths - of Man, of History, and of Metaphysics - as discussed in Chapter
Two. Varied interpretations of these deaths have generated considerable debate
concerning the value of the subject, the usefulness of history, and the necessity of
epistemology for feminist theory. As we will see, these difficulties are exacerbated when
considered in the context of feminist political organizing. This is, perhaps, why feminist
theory presents one of the most robust challenges for postmodernism. Not only is
postmodernism challenged by feminists on the basis of its theoretical assumptions, but
also in reference to its practical value. The remainder of section 3.2 seeks to render
explicit the tensions that were only implicit in Chapter Two. Once revealed, they will
then be examined in section 3.3, in light of the linguistic tum.
3.1.1 The Subject: Flax. Di Stefano. and Benhabib
While the role of the subject is certainly called into uestion by both feminists and
postmodernists, feminist theorists do not all agree with one another about how far the
critique should be taken. The disagreement raises the question of what sort of
subjectivity is required for feminist organizing, and it is most clearly revealed in the
works of Jane Flax and Christine Di Stefano. While Flax insists that subjectivity must be
fluid and multiple, Di Stefano argues that fractured identities of the sort proposed by Flax
provide an insufficient basis for feminist political organizing. Seyla Benhabib also enters
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into the fray, arguing that, while the subject can be 'radically situated,' we must also be
able to attribute responsibility to her.
Jane Flax views gender relations as the central concern of feminist theory, and thus
takes gender relations as the starting point of her investigation into the role of
subjectivity. However, she quickly points out that "the writings of women of colour have
compelled white feminists to confront problems of difference and the relations of
domination that are conditions of possibility for the coherence of our own theorizing and
category formation.,,122 That is, the challenges of cultural feminism have forced
feminists to question the theoretical bases of their politics. Issues of class and race
become intermixed with issues of gender, thus necessitating a new understanding of
gender relations that takes these sorts of differences into account. Flax argues that "the
experience of gender relations for any person and the structure of gender as a social
category are shaped by interactions of gender relations and other social relations such as
class and race.,,123 She asserts, therefore, that this problematization of gender and gender
relations leads feminist theorists toward a new understanding of subjectivity.
Because subjects are constituted by multiple axes of identity, and because these
identities vary over time, Flax insists that "a unitary selfis unnecessary, impossible, and a
dangerous illusion.,,124 In place of the unified selfofmodern philosophy, she advocates a
multiple and fluid subjectivity. "Only multiple and fluid subjects," she argues, "can
develop a strong enough aversion to domination to struggle against its always present and
122 Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis Politics and Philosophy. (New York:
Routledge, 1993) 145.
123 Flax, "Postrnodernism and Gender Relations," FeminismIPostrnodemism. 40.
124 Flax, Disputed Subjects 93.
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endlessly seductive temptations.,,125 Because "the unitary self is an effect of many kinds
of relations of domination," Flax contends that "it can only sustain its unity by splitting
off or repressing other parts of its own and others' subjectivity.,,126 That is, fractured or
multiple subjects are able to sustain the illusion of unity only by dominating 'lesser'
aspects of the self. By becoming a participant in domination in this way, it becomes
difficult for such subjects to struggle against its "endlessly seductive temptations."
Flax argues, therefore, that in the case of feminist theory, assuming a unified and
clearly delineated category of woman, upon which a politics of emancipation is based,
simply recreates or reinforces relations of domination. If one understands feminism as
seeking to emancipate women, then any given woman, in order to be a feminist, may be
required to suppress issues that arise due to her class or race. Likewise, other women will
have to be seen as women first, while other aspects of their identity are only secondary.
Because of these difficulties, and because identity and its relations are both complex and
changing, Flax insists that "none of us can speak for 'woman' because no such person
exists except within a specific set of (already gendered) relations.,,127 Any attempt to
define a category of woman that can be employed once anq for all within feminist theory
and politics will necessarily be inadequate. Thus, because feminism is confused by
multiple, fractured identities, as well as heavily influenced by the social relations through
which gender is constructed, Flax encourages us to "tolerate and interpret ambivalence,
125 Flax, Disputed Subjects 110.
126 Flax, Disputed Subjects 109.
127 Flax, "Postmodemism and Gender Relations," Feminism/Postmodemism 56.
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ambiguity, and multiplicity [and] expose the roots of our needs for imposing order and
structure.,,128 She further points out that, because of these characteristics, feminist theory
is properly understood as a type of postmodem philosophy.
Like Flax, Christine Di Stefano begins her investigation into the role of subjectivity
with gender. However, she disagrees with Flax both theoretically and politically. On the
theoretical front, she claims that, "If we are encouraged to embrace fractured identities,
we are inevitably drawn to the forbidden question: Fractured with respect to what?,,!29 Di
Stefano argues that the postmodem fracturing of identities includes the inevitable
incorporation of the modem understanding of subjectivity as a unitary, ahistorical self.
Fractured identities, she insists, are constructed upon the basis of a unified, core self,
which is then split apart in order to account for difference. She also argues that fractured
identity "is not a recognition, but a reduction to difference, to absolute indifference,
equivalence, interchangeability.,,!30 That is, the subject "dissolves into a perplexing
plurality of differences, none of which can be theoretically or politically privileged over
others.,,!3!
This is the political basis for Di Stefano's argument against Flax's understanding
of subjectivity, and against a feminist alliance with postmodemism. As demonstrated in
Chapter Two, Di Stefano argues that shared identity, under the category of woman, is
required for feminist political action. She insists that the power of a politics based on
solidarity of opposition rather than a shared identity is unreliable and "unable to generate
128 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," Feminism/Postmodernism 56.
129 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismlPostmodernism 76.
130 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodernism 77
131 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodernism 77.
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sufficient attachment and motivation on the part of potential activists.,,132 She questions
the possibility of creating a politics of opposition based on a deconstructive
understanding of identity, arguing that politics must, in order to be effective, be subject-
centered. Feminist politics must be fought by, and for, women as a group that shares a
common identity, and not just a common enemy.
Further, she opposes Flax's desire to tum away from the difficulties found in
analyses of gender. Di Stefano points out that, "in our haste to deconstruct hierarchical
distinctions such as gender as harmful illusions, we may fail to grasp 'their tenacious
rootedness in an objective world created over time and deeply resistant to change,.,,133 In
other words, gender may be a system of categorization that we have functioned with for
so long that it has become deeply ingrained in society and in our minds. To argue that
"none of us can speak for 'woman'," as Flax does, is premature. Rather, she argues that
the category of woman "May perhaps be best appreciated and utilized as an aporia within
contemporary theory: as a recurring paradox, question, dead end, or blind spot to which
we must repeatedly retum.,,134
Benhabib also enters into the debate over the role of the subject within feminist
theory after the postmodem tum. In Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism, she
sheds light on the difficulties that underlie the conflicting views of Flax and Di Stefano.
While Flax never offers a robust explanation of how feminist politics ought to proceed,
Di Stefano never addresses the issue of the rationality or the autonomy of the subject.
132 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postrnodemism 76.
m Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postrnodemism 77-78.
134 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodemism 78.
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Thus, Benhabib seeks to remedy these shortcomings within her own account of
subjectivity.
Benhabib agrees with the situated view of the self. That is, she is open to the
possibility that the subject is situated within various social, linguistic or discursive
practices. This revisioning allows the traditional modem concept of the self to be
"reformulated by taking account of the radical situatedness of the subject.,,135 "Surely,"
she argues, "a subjectivity that would not be structured by language, by narrative and by
the symbolic codes of narrative available in a culture is unthinkable... These narratives
are deeply colored and structured by the codes of expectable and understandable
biographies and identities in our culture.,,136 However, while it is possible to situate the
subject, Benhabib asserts that it is not possible to reduce the subject to social, linguistic,
or discursive practices if a politics of emancipation is to be maintained. She insists that
the normative vision and goals of feminist politics require agents who are able to partake
in rational discourse, and be accountable for their participation in it. She asks "how in
fact the very project of female emancipation would be thinkable without such a regulative
ideal of enhancing the agency, autonomy and selfhood ofwomen.,,137 In other words, we
must assume that women are free to creatively alter their world, if we are to act
politically to ensure that freedom. Thus, it is imperative that feminist theory avoid the
postmodem dissolution of the subject.
How is it possible to mediate between these two requirements - that the subject is
135 Benhabib, "Feminism of and the Question Postmodernism," Situating the Self 214.
136 Benhabib, "Feminism of and the Question Postmodernism," Situating the Self 214.
137 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 214.
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both autonomous and radically situated? In other words, how is it that the empirical self
is free on Benhabib's account? Benhabib argues that modem philosophy does not offer
an adequate resolution to this tension. She claims that both rationalist and empiricist
accounts of the self "cannot do justice to those contingent processes of socialization
through which an infant becomes a person, acquires language and reason, develops a
sense of justice and autonomy, and becomes capable of projecting a narrative into the
world of which she is not only the author but the actor as we11.,,138 In other words,
Benhabib insists that philosophy should take seriously the findings of the social sciences
in order to understand the way in which a human infant gains a sense of autonomy and
the capacity for reason. A better understanding of individuation and socialization
processes, informed by the social sciences, will provide the key to radically situating the
subject while maintaining her autonomy. For this reason, Benhabib contends that "The
analysis of gender once more forces the boundaries of disciplinary discourses toward a
new integration of theoretical paradigms.,,139
Thus, we see that there are three sides to the debate regarding subjectivity. The
first (Flax), argues that the self must be fluid and multiple, and that the complexity of
gender relations undermines the idea of a movement based on the emancipation of
women, conceived as a unified category. The second (Di Stefano), argues that fractured
identities are theoretically suspect, and that shared identity is required to create a strong,
reliable, political movement. The third (Benhabib) argues that the self, although radically
138 Benhabib, "Introduction: Communicative Ethics and the Claims of Gender, Community and
Postrnodernism," Situating the Self 5.
139 Benhabib, "Feminism of and the Question Postrnodemism," Situating the Self 218.
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situated, is socialized to become an autonomous, rational agent, and is thus capable of
creatively altering the world in which she lives.
3.1.2 History: Fraser and icholson, and Benhabib
The role of history within philosophical discourse is also the ground of some
debate among feminist theorists. However, as Benhabib points out, "Of all positions
normally associated with postl11odernism, [the Death of History] ... appears ... to be the
least problematic."14o This is because both feminists and postmodemists seek to
undermine faith in teleological metanalTatives. However, while it may be the case that
the postmodem death of History does not rankle with feminists as much as the death of
the Subject or of Metaphysics, it still gives rise to some discussion. I will outline the
debate here with reference to Fraser/Nicholson, whose postmodem feminist theory is
meant to be explicitly historical in the sense that it deals with genealogized categories,
and Benhabib, who insists upon retaining an interest in history that seeks to retrieve it
from the actual lives of women.
Both Fraser/Nicholson and Benhabib insist that the elimination of teleological
metanarratives does not necessitate a move from global history to local stories. That is,
they oppose Lyotard's conviction that analysis can take place only at the micro-social
level. Furthermore, both authors argue that an understanding of women's place in history
is a valuable tool in the feminist political project. Indeed, the ability to appeal to
women's history is necessary to fully appreciate and to achieve the goal of emancipation.
In order to retrieve this history, Fraser/Nicholson offer their postmodem feminist theory
140 Benhabib, "Feminism of and the Qut:stioll I'oslmodt:rnism," Situating the Self 218.
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as the appropriate method. However, Benhabib insists that their approach is, in fac ,not
postmodem, and she actually offers a perspective that is similar to theirs.
In Social Criticism Without Philosophy, FraserlNicholson assert that "a
postmodem feminist theory need forswear neither large historical narratives nor ana]yses
of societal macrostructures.,,141 They argue that a postmodem feminist theory can a. tend
to issues that transcend the merely local. However, they insist that such a theory ought to
avoid seeking a basis that can unify disparate situations. When theory moves beyond any
given culture or time period, it must strive to be comparativist rather than unifying. Thus,
they argue, feminist theory should "tailor its methods and categories to the specific task
at hand.,,142 Furthermore, such analyses would deal with categories that
"genealogized, that is, framed by a historical narrative and rendered temporally and
culturally specific.,,143 For example, in examining categories such as reproductic.n or
mothering, postmodem feminist theory would require analyses that include an
examination of how such categories came to exist within specific historical and cul-tural
situations.
Benhabib agrees with FraserlNicholson that "it is futile to seek to produce a single
grand theory of female oppression and male dominance across cultures and societieso.,,144
Yet, in order to combat the oppression that does exist, she argues that feminist th..eory
must maintain an interest in recovering the stories of groups and individuals who B:1ave
been oppressed throughout history. Benhabib identifies this as a 'history-from-be ow'
141 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," FeminismIPosttnodemism 34.
142 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," FeminismIPostmodemism. 35.
143 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," FeminismIPosttnodemism 34.
144 Benhabib, "Feminism of and the Question Postmodemism," Situating the Self 219.
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approach, "the task of which is to illuminate the gender, class, and race struggles through
which power is negotiated, subverted as well as resisted by the so-called 'victims' of
history.,,145 She contrasts this with what she calls 'postmodern historiography,146 which
attends to the discursive regimes that create any given situation of oppression.
While both theoretical options hold promise for feminist theory, Benhabib asserts
that postmodern historiography "emphasizes gender as 'difference,' marked by the
otherness and absolute silencing of women.,,147 That is, postmodern historiography
understands history as the progression of competing discourses through which individuals
and groups are constructed. This approach, Benhabib claims, does not enable women to
tell their own stories, as they simply become constructs of the discursive regimes in
which they are found. Therefore, Benhabib argues that engaged feminist theory requires
the 'history-from-below' approach, so that we can arrive at a " 'feminist transvaluation of
values' [through which] our present interest in women's strategies of survival and
historical resistance has led us to imbue these past activities, which were wholly
uninteresting from the standpoint of the traditional historian, with new meaning and
signficance."148
So what of Fraser/Nicholson's postmodern feminist approach to history - does it
not hold value for feminist practice? Benhabib is not explicitly opposed to the approach
forwarded by Fraser/Nicholson, because, she insists, it is not actually postmodern. She
145 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 222.
146 Benhabib attributes the postmodern historiographical approach, "in which the emphasis is on the
'construction' of the agency of the victims through mechanisms of social and discursive control," to
Foucault. "Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism," Situating the Self 222.
147 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 222.
148 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 220.
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points out that "what they mean by this kind of theorizing is less 'postmodemist' but
more 'neopragmatist'."J49 She interprets FraserlNieholson as adhering to neopragmatism
because they have not foregone theory altogether, which is, according to Benhabib, one
of the mandates of accepting the postl11odern position. Moreover, their method of
contextualizing said theory is representative of pragmatism, insofar as it stresses the
relation of theory and praxis. Thus, we see that Benhabib and FraserlNicholson disagree
more over appropriate terminology than they do regarding the role of history within
contemporary feminism.
There are two sides to the debate regarding history. The first (FraserlNicholson)
advocates a genealogization of categories within postmodem feminist analysis. The
second (Benhabib) insists that feminism requires an interest in history, which seeks to
recover the stories of actual womcn's lives so that they can be imparted with new
meaning and significance.
3.1.3 Metaphysics: Fraser and 1TirholsOIl. Benhabib. and Harding
Finally, the role of metaphysics l50 is the site of a great deal of debate among
feminist theorists. While all of the authors found in Chapter Two address this issue to
some degree, I will focus on thc works of Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, Seyla
Benhabib, and Sandra Harding in this section to outline the debate. While
FraserlNicholson contend that epistemology no longer retains any usefulness for feminist
149 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question of Post modernism," Situating the Self 220.
150 Within post-Kantian critical discussion, metaphysics tends to become equated with epistemology. This
is true particularly in light of Rorty's description or modern philosophy. Thus, because many of the
authors discussed critique epistemology rather th~lIl mct~lphysics qua metaphysics, I will use these two
terms interchangeably throughout the remainder of [hi· thesis.
action, both Harding and Benhabib understand epistemology to be necessary to the
functionality of feminist theory and politics. Harding strengthens her commitment to
epistemology by grounding knowledge claims upon feminist science projects.
FraserlNicholson's examination of the feminist-postmodernist relationship is
initiated by their accusation that "feminist scholarship has remained insufficiently
attentive to the theoretical prerequisites of dealing with diversity, despite widespread
commitment to accepting it politically." I 51 In other words, they argue that feminist
politics has taken to heart the lessons of cultural feminism by accommodating a
multiplicity of perspectives. However, this does not mean that feminist theory has kept
pace with its political practice. On the contrary, feminist theory, FraserlNicholson argue,
has yet to produce a theoretical basis that can adequately explain the evolution that has
taken place on the political front. Thus, they tum to postmodernism, believing that a
postmodern feminist theory can address the practical needs of feminists.
This accommodation of difference motivates their eschewal of epistemology. In
Social Criticism Without Philosophy, FraserlNicholson attempt to expose the hazards of
invoking epistemological foundations within feminism. Tqeir concern is that feminism,
as social critic, loses its transformative powers when it relies upon traditional
philosophical underpinnings. They claim that "Practical imperatives have led some
feminists to adopt modes of theorizing which resemble the sorts of philosophical
metanarrative rightly criticized by postmodernists.,,152 Liberal and radical feminist
151 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodemism 33.
152 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodemism 26.
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theories, they insist, "assume methods and concepts which are uninflected by temporality
or historicity and which therefore function de facto as permanent, neutral matrices for
inquiry.,,153 Ultimately, FraserlNicholson insist that feminism and postmodernism are
allies because "both have sought to develop new paradigms of social criticism which do
not rely on traditional philosophical underpinnings.,,154
In direct opposition to the view espoused by FraserlNicholson, Benhabib's
examination of the feminist debate over the role of epistemology asserts that "Social
criticism without some form of philosophy is not possible, and without social criticism
the project of a feminist theory which is at once committed to knowledge and to the
emancipatory interests of women is inconceivable.,,155 She points out that "Social
criticism needs philosophy precisely because the narratives of our cultures are so
conflictual and irreconcilable that, even when one appeals to them, a certain ordering of
one's normative priorities, a statement of methodological assumptions guiding one's
choice of narratives, and a clarification of those principles in the name of which one
speaks is unavoidable.,,156 In other words, the basis of social criticism is the ability to
favour one particular description of the world. Yet, ip appealing to that specific
description, it is necessary to justify that choice epistemologically.
According to Benhabib, it is possible to create "an epistemology and politics
which recognizes the lack of metanarratives and foundational guarantees but which
nonetheless insists on formulating minimal criteria of validity for our discursive and
153 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism 27.
154 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism Without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism 19.
155 Benhabib, Feminism and the Question ofPostrnodernism," Situating the Self, 225.
156 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostrnodernism," Situating the Self 226.
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political practices.,,157 In other words, it is possible to avoid the pitfalls associated with
metanarrative, but still retain an epistemological basis for political action. This is
accomplished by way of communicative action, which maintains that discourse provides
a basis for justifying norms. 158
In Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques, Harding argues that,
"when traditional grounds for knowledge claims are not available, there is not only the
problem of justifying one's claims to others, but also the problem of justifying them to
oneself and to those who might prove sympathetic to feminist goals.,,159 That is,
feminists require an epistemological basis upon which they can ground both their claims
and their choices.
However, this epistemological basis is not that which is conceived by modem
philosophy. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, the feminist science projects that are
presented by Harding destabilize the epistemological framework that traditionally
grounded knowledge claims. By situating the knowing subject, both feminist empiricism
and feminist standpoint theory develop new justificatory strategies, thereby pushing
traditional science beyond the boundaries of modem thought. Therefore, feminists in the
scientific traditions are uniquely capable of developing new explanations which will
point the way to improving the conditions of women. More specifically, feminist science
projects are able to "bring to consciousness less mystified understandings of women's
157 Benhabib, "Epistemologies ofPostmodemism," FeminismIPostmodemism 125.
158 I do not want to delve too deeply into Habermas' concept of discourse, which Benhabib employs here.
For further discussion of this topic, see Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action.
159 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," FeminismIPostmodemism 89.
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and men's situations so that these understandings can energize and direct women and
men to struggle on behalf of eliminating the subordination ofwomen.,,160
These are the three sides of the debate regarding epistemology. The first
(FraserlNicholson) is a postmodem feminist theory that forswears allegiance to
epistemological bases. The second (Benhabib) insists that feminism, as a form of social
criticism, must maintain epistemology in order to guide choices in feminist political
practice. The third (Harding) also argues that epistemology is necessary for feminism,
and insists that feminist science projects can develop new justificatory strategies that can
be employed to ground this epistemology, and hence, feminist political action.
3.2 Resolution
If postmodemism is to be wholly adopted by feminists, then the linguistic tum
must also be adopted. To be a postmodemist is to take up the linguistic tum. Do feminist
theorists who wish to ally with postmodemism adopt the imperatives of the linguistic
tum? Let me tum to an analysis of the tensions just outlined in light of the linguistic
tum. In so doing, I will demonstrate that, even those feminists who insist upon adopting
postmodemism in forwarding the goals of feminism, adhere to pre-linguistic tum
philosophical and methodological assumptions. If feminist theorists better understood
the linguistic tum, then the tensions that have emerged among them may be diffused.
First, allow me to provide a brief overview of the linguistic tum. Recall, from
Chapter One, that ordinary language philosophers "Do no think that when we say
160 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," FeminismIPostmodemism, 90.
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something we must necessarily be expressing a view about a subject. We might just be
saying something - participating in a conversation rather than contributing to an inquiry.
Perhaps saying things is not always saying how things are.,,161 Thus, language is no
longer representative; it is not understood as a medium designed to either represent
external reality or to express inner states. Rather, language is performative, and
philosophical difficulties of the sort that characterize modem philosophy arise only when
words are 'performed' incorrectly. Thus, by examining how language is ordinarily used,
such difficulties can be either solved or dissolved.
I have suggested that an analysis of the linguistic tum can help to resolve some of
the tensions that I have just outlined. In order for the linguistic tum to prove helpful in
resolving these tensions, it must either demonstrate that one side of the tension is more
right (or more wrong) than the others, or show the way to a common ground between the
various sides of the debate. In each case, we find that analyzing the tum does in fact
point us in a specific direction. While it cannot be safely asserted that this is the final
word on the topic, I maintain that this analysis does prove to be instructive when
attempting to navigate the difficult terrain of the feminist-postmodemist debate.
3.2.1 The Subject and the Linguistic Turn
As I have already demonstrated, there are three sides to the debate regarding
subjectivity. By examining these positions with reference to the linguistic tum, we will
see that the tension among Flax, Di Stefano and Benhabib can be more clearly
understood, and, perhaps, even resolved. What this analysis reveals is that Flax, who has
161 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 371.
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made the linguistic tum, does not actually take it as far as postmodemism, although she
claims that her position is a type of postmodem philosophy. Di Stefano strongly adheres
to pre-linguistic tum understandings of the self, although she inadvertently reveals that
such a position is no longer viable. Benhabib, who has also made the linguistic tum, is
correct in claiming that her understanding of subjectivity is neither modem nor
postrnodem.
Despite what conclusions the linguistic tum yields for postmodemists, it remains
the case that the philosophical method introduced by the tum is to examine language in
use. The critique of representational knowledge suggests that our words and expressions
do not point to something in the world. Thus, when we speak of the 'self,' we are
referring neither to a metaphysical substance nor to a clearly-defined empirical entity.
Similarly, when we speak of 'woman,' there is no clearly-delineated category represented
by the word. Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblances demonstrates that categories
are not clearly circumscribed, but rather that we employ words to identify similarities
between spheres of experience. Neither 'self nor 'woman' designates an essential unity,
nor do these terms point us toward some identifiable human nature.
Does Flax's conception of postmodem subjectivity adhere to this dictate? Flax
argues that "Subjectivity is not an illusion, but the subject is a shifting and always
changing intersection of complex, contradictory, and unfinished processes.,,162 That is,
the modem, unitary and ahistorical self is replaced by fluid and multiple subjectivities,
which cannot be circumscribed by any essential definition. It is obvious, then, that Flax
162 Flax, Disputed Subjects 108.
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does take the linguistic turn seriously in her construction of postmodem subjectivity.
However, she claims that this subject also possesses "capacities for abstract thought,
work, and language; aggression; creativity; fantasy; meaning creation; and
objectivity.,,163 Thus, we see that Flax's subject still retains control over language. Yet,
according to postmodemism, the subject is an effect of discourse, and no longer the
creator of it. Flax's conception of subjectivity that is capable of creating meaning and
attaining objectivity is clearly at odds with the postmodem death of the Subject. Thus,
Flax's desire to maintain a subject who is capable of transforming her world, and her
desire to attend to the difficulties of difference raised by feminist politics, cause her
postmodem philosophy to be self-contradictory.
What of Flax's broader assertion, that "none of us can speak for 'woman' because
no such person exists,,?164 Again, Flax has clearly appropriated the lessons of the
linguistic tum in her analysis of the complexities of gender relations. She argues that
"gender relations thus have no fixed essence; they vary both within and over time.,,165
Yet Flax also insists that, "by studying gender we hope to gain a critical distance on
existing gender arrangements. This critical distance can help clear a space in which
reevaluating and altering our existing gender arrangements may become more
possible.,,166 How, one may ask, is this critical distance achieved if the inquiring and
critically-reflective subject is mired within gender relations, and ultimately within
language? It is clearly the case that Flax's desire to maintain a feminist theory and
163 Flax, Disputed Subjects 106.
164 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," FeminismIPostmodernism, 56.
165 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," FeminismIPostmodernis!!!, 40.
166 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," Feminism/Postmodernis!!!, 40.
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political practice with social critical force does not lead her to the conclusion of
postmodernism. Although she argues that, "As a type of postmodern philosophy,
feminist theory reveals and contributes to the growing uncertainty within Western
intellectual circles about the appropriate grounding and methods for explaining and
interpreting human experience,"167 Flax's reliance upon pre-linguistic turn
understandings of subjectivity indicates that feminist theory is not, in this case, a type of
postmodern philosophy. Rather, feminist theory and postrnodernism offer parallel
critiques of traditional views of the self that do not converge.
Di Stefano, who argues against a feminist alliance with postrnodernism, claims
that the fracturing of identity and the idea of a solidarity of opposition will necessarily
undermine the feminist normative vision. She claims that "For the time being, then,
postmodernism is as entrenched in the dilemmas of difference as are the modernist and
anti-modernist alternatives.,,168 That is, the reduction of the unified self into fractured
identities, she argues, causes us to lose sight of 'woman,' and, consequently, of a
movement dedicated to her emancipation. Thus, she identifies gender "as a recurring
paradox, question, dead end, or blind spot to which we Il}ust repeatedly return,,,169 Di
Stefano seems to imply that closer investigation may help us to define or understand
gender once and for all.
However, Di Stefano further points out that the study of gender is not only
empirical, but theoretical and normative as well. That is, she claims, "in asking how
167 Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations," Feminism/Postmodernism 40-41.
168 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismfPostmodernism 77.
169 Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," FeminismfPostmodernism 78
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basic gender differences are, we are also asking how basic we want them to be.,,170 This
assertion, while certainly pragmatic, reveals a tension between empirical and theoretical
elements of the study of gender. This tension reveals that Di Stefano's argument is itself
conflicted regarding our role in the construction of gender, and the ability to discover
such differences in order to employ them within political practice. While Di Stefano
does not offer a thorough examination or explanation of how these two elements can co-
exist, it is clear that she has not taken the lessons of the linguistic tum to heart, and this
causes difficulty for her.
Finally, Benhabib's radically situated self is a product of post-linguistic tum
thinking. She claims that subjects are not disembodied cogitos or abstract unities of
transcendental apperception,,,17I but rather that the subject is "an embodied and
embedded human self whose identity is constituted narratively.,,172 Thus, it is clear that
the subject, on Benhabib's account, is constituted by discourse. However, because
Benhabib is adamant that the subject is not determined by discourse, her appropriation of
the linguistic tum does not bring her in line with postmodemism. She explicitly denies
that postmodem concepts of subjectivity hold any promise for feminist organizing
because they undermine the subject's ability to take part in rational discourse. Thus,
Benhabib's conception of subjectivity is situated between the modem, understood as pre-
linguistic tum philosophy, and postmodemism.
Benhabib also asserts that the task of identifying how to use the word 'woman' is
170 Oi Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference," Feminism/Postmodernism 66.
171 Benhabib, "Introduction," Situating the Self 5.
172 Benhabib, "Introduction," Situating the Self 6.
77
best left to the social scientist. That is, she insists that the categories of social research
"cannot be determined by epistemological arguments extraneous to the task at hand.,,173
Thus, the boundaries between philosophy and the social sciences, she argues, ought to be
re-evaluated. Does this undermine the efficacy of a politics based on the emancipation of
woman? Are we restricted in our ability to speak on her behalf because we don't know,
once and for all, who she is? The inability to define woman once and for all does not
preclude us from employing the term or category for specific purposes. While this may
have been the point ofDi Stefano's claim that the study of gender is both empirical and
normative, she was unable to hold this position consistently because she still held to the
dictates of representational knowledge. However, Benhabib's post-linguistic tum, but
not postmodemist position, enables her to hold this hypothesis without contradiction.
Because the social scientist is able to define 'woman' according to her needs, she is not
restricted to an essential definition. Yet, Benhabib's maintenance of the rational,
autonomous individual allows her to use this knowledge for political ends.
3.2.2 History & The Linguistic Turn
I have shown that there are two sides to the debate regarding history. An
examination of this debate in light of the linguistic tum once again clarifies where
FraserlNicholson and Benhabib are actually situated. The understanding of history as
proposed by FraserlNicholson's postmodem feminist theory is not actually postmodem,
and, because of their rejection of epistemology (which will be explained in further detail
in the section 3.2.3), raises serious questions as to whether they have even made the
173 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodemism," Situating the Self 220.
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linguistic turn. On the other hand, Benhabib's history-from-below approach, which is not
postmodern, does take into account the imperatives of the linguistic turn.
Benhabib is correct in her assertion that Fraser/Nicholson's 'even-handed and
commonsensical approach to tailoring theory to the tasks at hand is not
postmodemist.,,174 I agree with Benhabib that their approach is not postmodernist,
although I arrive at this conclusion by way of a different route. While Benhabib argues
that Fraser/Nicholson's approach is more pragmatic than it is postmodernist, I argue that
it is not postmodernist because their approach raises the question of whether they have
determined a sufficient method, beyond the episteme of representation, for judging
various genealogies.
Fraser/Nicholson argue that the categories of postmodern feminist analysis should
be genealogized. Politically, this approach "seeks to 'establish a historical knowledge of
struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today,.,,175 While this approach
to interpreting history does in fact avoid the entanglements that accompany teleological
metanarratives, it does not offer a way of evaluating the different genealogies with which
one may be presented.
Within feminist theory, we are faced with the idea that interpreting the past still
depends upon examining how things were. While it is possible that large historical
narratives within feminism can be pragmatic and fallibilistic, with methods tailored to a
specific task, they are still created with the intention of reaching a specific goal. If the
174 Benhabib, "Feminism and the Question ofPostmodernism," Feminism/Postmodemism 220.
175 Lee Quinby, "Genealogical Feminism: a Politic Way of Looking," Feminism and the New Democracy:
Re-siting the Political ed. Jodi Dean. (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1997) 146.
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critical force of feminism relies, in part, upon interpreting the past while being ever
mindful of the imperatives of genealogy, how does one evaluate varied interpretations or
genealogies? FraserlNicholson do not deny that there is a moral-political imperative in
place that guides feminist theory. Their desire is to "conceive a version of criticism
without philosophy which is robust enough to handle the tough job of analyzing sexism
in all its endless variety and monotonous similarity.,,176 However, as demonstrated in
section 3.1.3, FraserlNicholson reject epistemology outright, and thus do not offer any
way of dealing with the problem of judging various, and potentially conflictual,
genealogies.
Given that FraserlNicholson's postmodern feminist theory does not offer a basis
upon which various genealogies can be interpreted, perhaps the only option they are left
with is to interpret them by evaluating which is more accurate. That is, which narrative
more accurately represents the truth than the others. If this is the case, (and granted,
FraserlNicholson would likely deny this reading) then FraserlNicholson's political
commitments are clearly at odds with their postmodernism. FraserlNicholson may be
able to sidestep this concern by claiming that Benhabib is in fact right, and that they are
actually advocating a version of pragmatism rather than postrnodernism. Yet the
following question remains to be asked: can a political movement that seeks to create real
change, and that seeks to convince others that such change is needed, rely on these sorts
of pragmatic foundations? Is it enough to act politically on stories 'as if they point to
how things 'really were'?
176 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," FeminismIPostmodemism. 34.
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It is clear that the role of history within FraserlNicholson's postmodem feminist
theory indicates that they have not fully adopted the postmodem position. Moreover,
because they do not offer any sort of basis upon which to judge various genealogies, it is
quite possible that they have yet to take leave of the imperatives of the episteme of
representation. Ironically, they fall victim to their own accusation that "feminist critics
continue tacitly to rely on the sorts of philosophical underpinnings which their own
commitments, like those of the postmodemists, ought in principle to rule OUt.,,177
Rather than asserting a postmodem position in relation to history, Benhabib's
history-from-below approach is designed to allow room for the feminist transvaluation of
values. However, because Benhabib's approach allows room for an epistemological
framework according to which various interpretations of history can be favoured, she
manages to avoid the difficulty that plagues FraserlNicholson's position. If we are to
create a politics of emancipation based, in part, upon the appropriation of women's
stories, how are we to judge those stories? Benhabib, who does not reject epistemology,
but rather embraces the potential of communicative action, is able to account for this
need to justify which narrative is chosen.
3.2.3 Metaphysics & The Linguistic Turn
There are three sides to the debate regarding metaphysics. An examination of
these positions in light of the linguistic tum will demonstrate that the tension among
FraserlNicholson, Benhabib and Harding can be mitigated. We will see that
FraserlNicholson's postmodem feminist theory retains vestiges of representational
177 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism 20.
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thought. Benhabib, who has self-consciously accepted the linguistic tum, searches for an
alternate epistemological basis for feminist political practice, thus forgoing the option of
postmodernism. Harding, who is opposed to postmodernism but sees value in its
criticisms, remains decidedly modem due to her reliance upon traditional scientific goals
and methods, and consequently, the episteme of representation.
The role of epistemology within feminist theory is perhaps the most difficult
terrain to navigate, but it is important to keep in mind the dictates of the linguistic tum.
The linguistic tum called for the end of the episteme of representation. In other words,
the epistemological system that characterized the entirety of philosophical history from
Descartes through to the Enlightenment was thought to have ended. Regardless of what
postmodernists seek to replace this episteme with, the linguistic tum dictated that
language could no longer be understood as a medium of representation. Recall that
"saying something does not necessarily mean we are expressing a view about a
subject.,,178 Thus, because any postmodern position necessarily involves an appropriation
of this view, it is important to determine whether or not any feminist theorist who claims
to be postmodernist does, in fact, avoid representationalism.
As previously mentioned, FraserlNicholson's desire to accomodate difference
motivates their eschewal of epistemology. But, they also insist that "a phenomenon as
pervasive and multifaceted as male dominance cannot be adequately grasped with the
meager critical resources to which [the postmodemists] would limit US.,,179 Thus, their
178 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 371.
179 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," FeminismIPostmodernism 26.
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postmodem feminist theory is tailored to serve two functions: 1. To meet the political
demands of cultural feminism, and 2. To maintain a critical social theory that can "handle
the tough job of analyzing sexism in all its endless variety and monotonous similarity.,,180
However, does their deployment of large theoretical tools adhere to the dictates of the
linguistic tum? As I pointed out in the previous section, FraserlNicholson run into
troubles with regards to their understanding of history. In that case, their rejection of
epistemology meant that they were unable to judge between various genealogies, and
were, potentially, left to rely upon the episteme of representation to determine their
choices. If we carry this criterion over to the realm of epistemology, the following
question must be asked: if we no longer maintain some method of choosing between
narratives, then what becomes of the feminist normative vision?
However, the difficulty with FraserlNicholson's postmodem feminist theory
begins even before this. They write, "Suppose one began, not with the condition of
Philosophy, but with the nature of the social object one wished to criticize. Suppose,
further, that one defined that object as the subordination of women to and by men.,,18l
Thus, FraserlNicholson assume, a priori, that there exists a social object to criticize,
namely, the subordination of women. In other words, they argue that it is true that
women are subordinated by men. How, one may ask, are they able to make this assertion
if their position is truly postmodem?
In opposition to FraserlNicholson, Benhabib rejects postmodernism outright.
180 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism 34.
181 Fraser and Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy," Feminism/Postmodernism 26.
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However, she also self-consciously indicates that feminists have moved beyond the
episteme of representation. That is, she articulates, in no uncertain terms, that she has
made the linguistic tum. The summary of Benhabib's position in regards to the self in
section 3.2.1, has already demonstrated this fact, and hence I will not revisit it here.
However, it is important to note that she insists that working within the horizon of the
linguistic tum does not necessitate a move toward postmodernism. Rather, she asks,
"What are the epistemological options opened by the demise of the classical episteme of
representation?,,182 Whatever they may be, she adds that "it is necessary that we think the
epistemic alternatives created by the present...to their moral and political ends.,,183
Harding, who also argues against a feminist alliance with postmodernism, does so
because she holds that feminists need an epistemological basis upon which to ground
their claims and choices. However, upon examining her position in light of the linguistic
tum, we see that, in a very important sense, she does not necessarily leave behind the
imperatives of the episteme of representation. That is, her belief that science, and even
feminist science projects, can underwrite the possibility of political action, represents an
adherence to representational thought. Harding's goal is to "defend the viability and
progressiveness of the feminist science and epistemology projects against their
postmodernist critics.,,184 They ought to be defended, she claims, because "they
envision emancipatory possibilities for the harnessing of power to knowledge.,,185
182 Benhabib, "Epistemologies of Postmodernism," Feminism/Postmodernism 109.
183 Benhabib, "Epistemologies of Postmodernism," Feminism/Postmodernism 124.
184 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postmodernism, 83.
185 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postmodernism, 83.
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Thus, Harding not only believes that epistemology is needed to ground political
choices and actions, but also that science can help infonn these choices. Implicit within
these claims seems to be the idea that science can help us to discover truth, and thus help
us appropriately detennine our actions. Harding attempts to sidestep this concern by
claiming that feminist science projects can "aim to produce less partial and perverse
representations without having to assert the absolute, complete, universal, or eternal
adequacy of these representations.,,186 However, although she argues that truth and
falsity may not constitute opposite ends of the same spectrum,187 she does not go on to
develop this line of argument. This is surprising considering that, of the many challenges
that her feminist science projects face, the idea that both feminist empiricism and feminist
standpoint theory still strive toward truth is likely the most contentious. For the time
being, then, it is safe to assume that Harding's adherence to science and epistemology not
only place her before postmodernism, but before the linguistic tum itself.
As Benhabib points out, "The struggle over what lies beyond the classical
imperative remains unresolved.,,188 It is clear that, thus far, the choices are limited such
that feminists are often forced to embrace postmodernism, even though I have shown that
186 Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques," Feminism/Postmodernism. 100.
187 Harding borrows this idea from Thomas Kuhn, who "argued that it would be better to understand the
history of science in terms of increasing distance from falsity rather than closeness to truth." (Harding, 100)
Harding contends that such a revolutionary idea in the history of science can likely be seen as an option
within feminist theory as well. However, she devotes less than a paragraph to this idea, which is, I think, a
shortcoming within her defense of feminist science projects, and why I have chosen to focus on it here.
188 Benhabib, "Epistemologies ofPostmodernism," Feminism/Postmodernism 125.
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such an alliance seems to be in name only. While it is certainly true that "feminists, like
other theorists, work today in a context marked by the problematization of language,"189
feminist theorists, because of their feminism, are unable follow this assumption through
to the 'conclusion of postmodernism.' Are other alternatives possible? To be a
postmodernist is to embrace the linguistic tum. Is it the case that embracing the linguistic
tum requires one to be postmodern?
Chapter Three has suggested that an examination of various feminist theories in
light of the linguistic tum can help clear the cluttered terrain of the feminist-
postmodemist debate. Indeed, this analysis has revealed that some feminist theorists (at
least those outlined here) still cling to the ideals of modem philosophy and the episteme
of representation. The desire to create an effective political movement seems to be
incompatible with a complete adoption of the postmodem position. In the case of some
of the feminist theorists outlined, it even seems to hinder the rejection of representational
knowledge.
The need to maintain a subject who is able to shape the world through language;
the desire to interpret history with an eye toward improving the situation of women; and
the imperative of maintaining an ability to justify one's actions and choices; all inhibit the
complete rejection of epistemology. Does this mean that no other epistemology is
possible? Is it not possible to be a feminist after the linguistic tum?
189 Nancy Fraser, "Pragmatism, Feminism, and the Linguistic Tum," 157.
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CONCLUSION
I began this project with the goal of determining whether an examination of the
feminist-postmodemist debate in light of the linguistic tum's role in the development of
postmodemism would help to resolve some of the tensions that have plagued the
relationship between feminism and postmodemism from its very beginnings. Such an
analysis has revealed that feminist theorists are situated at various locations in relation to
the linguistic tum and its imperatives.
Some theorists claim to be postmodemist, but contradict themselves by retaining
some form of epistemology, some even adhering to the dictates of representational
knowledge. Others refuse both the linguistic tum and postmodemism, preferring to
maintain feminist political practice from within the modem philosophical system. Still
others, who have self-consciously made the linguistic tum, do not want to risk an alliance
with postmodernism, and thus seek an alternate epistemological basis upon which the
normative vision and social-critical force of feminism can be based.
I ended Chapter Three with the following questions: Does the end of the episteme
of representation mean that no other epistemology is possible? Is it not possible to be a
feminist after the linguistic tum? While I can make no claim to offering the final answer
at this point, I believe that this thesis has demonstrated that there are two imperatives in
place for feminist theory: 1. Feminism cannot follow the linguistic tum through to the
'conclusion of postmodemism.' Attempts to do so have resulted in ironically self-
contradictory and self-refuting positions. Moreover, the lack of epistemology entailed by
the postmodem position runs too high a risk for feminist political practice. 2. That
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feminists must make the linguistic tum is inevitable. Similar to the Cartesian subjective
tum or to Kant's Copernican revolution, the linguistic tum was a revolution within
contemporary philosophy from which there is no turning back. The episteme of
representation has been shown to be lacking, and this perhaps more so for feminism than
for any other theoretical concern.
In order to live up to these two imperatives, feminism must search for a new and
alternate epistemology, one that will allow the transformative powers of feminism to
continue. What this new epistemology is cannot be answered here, although it is clear
that the feminist theorists who have been analysed in this thesis offer a number of
opportunities for the future. The debate between feminism and postmodernism is yet in
its infancy. Thus, it is likely that the debate and discussion will continue, and that even
more opportunities will present themselves. If feminist theorists, along with their
political counterparts, indeed seek the emancipation of women, then doubtless such
discussions, in which there is so much at stake, will persist for many years to come.
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